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restricted on a country-of-origin basis, when reacting to a proximate threat, and when the program serves a
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Abstract: 
Issues of migration and border management are a dominant part of political discourse, 
particularly in Europe where countries grapple with high-profile drownings in the Mediterranean 
Sea. These tragedies and subsequent discourse reflect a move towards restricted territorial 
access, governed by stringent policies and concerns of national security. Migration literature 
often focuses on the barriers that prevent forced migrants from safely and legally accessing 
territory, but less often considers the ability of institutions to overcome these barriers. This thesis 
seeks to understand the conditions that allow institutions to facilitate mobility through the 
issuance of travel documents. Employing a comparative case study that analyzes the Nansen 
Passport scheme of the 1920s against the Humanitarian Corridors initiative launched in 2015, 
this thesis teases out tentative conclusions regarding facilitated refugee mobility. Specifically, 
while many factors are case-specific, institutions have historically succeeded in facilitating 
movement for refugees when the beneficiaries are restricted on a country-of-origin basis, when 
reacting to a proximate threat, and when the program serves a key interest of the benefactor. 
Furthermore, mobility can be facilitated even in the absence of clear legal frameworks or 
mandates. Given the dearth of scholarly attention to this issue, and the current prominence of the 
Humanitarian Corridors initiative in discussions of European policy, this study suggests 
important implications for future research both on the domestic determinant of facilitated 
mobility programs as well as the possibility of program replication.  
 
Keywords​: refugee mobility, territorial access, Nansen Passport, humanitarian visa; 
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Section I. Introduction 
 
     In June 2018, British newspaper ​The Guardian​ published a listing of 34,361 names. Compiled 
by a European NGO called United for Intercultural Action, the list identified every known 
migrant and refugee who died trying to access European territory since 1993.  
     Downloaded as a pdf, the document spans 56 pages, and details gender, age, region of origin, 
and cause of death. Edmond Kapraku (man, 30, Albania), killed by boat propeller after falling 
into the sea. Marun Adeba (boy, 2, Iraq), frozen to death in a refrigerated truck. Marian Shaka 
(woman, 20, Nigeria) drowned while pregnant in a shipwreck off the coast of Libya. Berrais 
Fethi (man, 30, Tunisia), found in an advanced state of decomposition near coast of Algeria. The 
list stretches on.  
     ​The Guardian​’s publication is hardly the first time the media has documented the perils of 
irregular entry. After the 2013 shipwreck that killed 360 refugees off the Italian island of 
Lampedusa, international news sources and politicians looked critically at the idea of ‘Fortress 
Europe,’  sparking heated debates about European policy and procedures of entry. Media 1
attention intensified after 2015, a year that featured land arrivals surpassing 1 million people and 
the viral images of toddler Alan Kurdi’s drowned body. This coverage propagated crisis 
narratives and encouraged stringent immigration policies. 
     In recent years, it has become commonplace, trendy even, to write on refugees. Yet while 
much has been written about the consequences of restricted mobility (human smuggling, 
drowning at sea, dangerous routes), little has been written about institutionalized mechanisms of 
1 ​A term often used in discussing European immigration law, and borrowed from World War 2 military 
propaganda.  
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 mobility.  Scholars and advocates tend to write of restrictive policies rather than examine 2
interpretations of those policies that might allow for the provision of safe access. In particular, 
although European law allows states to administer visas on humanitarian grounds to facilitate 
territorial access, little news coverage or scholarship addresses refugee travel documents as a 
mechanism of mobility.  
     European law grants constituent states equal power to provide safe access through travel 
document issuance, but they fail to issue said documents consistently, or at a coordinated level. 
At first glance, this seems logical: the sheer scale and volume of displacement, logistical issues, 
and anti-immigrant sentiment all suggest that states might think twice before facilitating safe 
access to territory. However, a closer look at European law and historical precedent reveals that 
throughout history European governments have issued travel documents to refugees, sometimes 
in coordination with other states. In these cases, states allowed individuals to bypass dangerous 
migratory routes, providing safety passage either by creating new institutional capacities or 
operating within existing legal frameworks.  
     This presents a puzzle: why have European nations facilitated mobility in some circumstances 
but not others? And why don’t systems of coordination exist presently, in the face of mass 
displacement, record irregular migration to Europe, and staggering numbers of migration-related 
deaths? The following chapters focus closely on these questions, analyzing mechanisms of 
mobility through a historical and comparative lens to isolate conditions of success. This thesis 
conceptualizes conditions of success primarily as those factors that contribute to the issuance of 
travel documents to refugees, and secondarily as the strategies employed by states to act within 
2 Defined here as formally accepted schemes endorsed by an authority structure (such as an international 
organization, group of states, etc.) that that facilitate movement across borders/seas. 
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 legal structures and policy arrangements to facilitate mobility. Sometimes these conditions are 
transnationally coordinated through harmonization, while other times transnational arrangements 
give the space and encouragement (but not the mandate) for individual states to exercise 
discretion. This thesis considers not the outcome or scale of programs and initiatives, but 
whether or not states/institutions/actors successfully facilitate movement by issuing travel 
documents.  
     Rather than focus, as much existing literature does, on the inadequacies and failings of the 
current system, this study employs positive framings to identify the requisite factors for 
facilitated mobility. It proceeds in five main parts, beginning with a literature review (Section II) 
that assesses relevant scholarship, focusing largely on three salient trends: migrant routes to 
Europe, increased restriction to territory and asylum, and the asymmetric interpretation of legal 
frameworks. The literature review concludes by isolating gaps in this research, and arguing for 
new scholarly framings that focus on positive examples of mobility rather than negative ones.  
     Section III examines the conditions surrounding the first recorded example of state and 
institutional issuance of travel documents to forced migrants: Nansen Passports and Russian 
refugees in post-WWI Europe. The objective of this section is to tease out early lessons 
regarding facilitated mobility, and the conditions that allowed for success within the particular 
context of 20th century Europe.  
     Section IV explores the evolution of legal frameworks and institutional discourse regarding 
migration, paying particular attention to changing definitions of refugee status and protection, the 
European Schengen agreements, Visa Code regulation, and policy coordination. Having 
established legal and institutional landscapes--and their complicated relationship to 
7 
 mobility--this thesis proceeds to Section V, which introduces a contemporary case study 
investigation: Italy’s Humanitarian Corridors, initiated for facilitated mobility in Europe. Upon 
advancing tentative hypotheses regarding the factors contributing to the success of Humanitarian 
Corridors, this theory turns to Section VI to assess wider conclusions, limitations, and 
implications for future research.  
     This is, admittedly, an unconventional structure. The reader may, for example, express 
confusion upon finishing one case study only to encounter an entirely new chapter before starting 
the second. However, the nature of the material mandates such structure. The two case studies 
focus on a similar phenomenon (coordinated provision of travel documents, therefore allowing 
comparison), but they nonetheless operate within entirely different contexts and eras. Not only 
did the international political environment undergo monumental change, but so too did legal 
frameworks (i.e., the 1951/1967 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Schengen 
acquis, etc.) and institutionalization (the United Nations, the emergence of the European Union, 
etc.). With regard to mobility and rights-based affordances, the Europe of Case Study #1 is 
simply not the same as the Europe of Case Study #2.  The section between each accounts for this 
evolution, mapping out institutional capacity and the unique context within which legal 
frameworks relating to mobility operate.  
     This thesis is unconventional not only in structure but also in approach: rather than center on 
restricted mobility, it focuses on the less-studied, less-understood exceptions. Safe and facilitated 
movement can exist for refugees. This thesis seeks to understand how. For scholars of migration 
and policy-makers alike, this approach holds potential for a highly valuable contribution. 
Scholars may benefit from this investigation of an understudied phenomenon: mechanisms of 
8 
 safe migration beyond the ones usually considered, which have operated successfully within 
different times and contexts, both before and after the creation of relevant international 
institutions. For policymakers, this research lays out successful examples of initiatives and 
partnerships forged to facilitate mobility, which may serve as potential models for future 
programs.  
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 Section II. Literature Review  
     Migration is hardly a new phenomenon; there have been migrants since man drew lines and 
called them borders. In recent years, however, increased water-based migration and highly 
publicized drownings have contributed to an explosion of scholarship in the field, with a 
particular focus on forced migration and access to European territory. The scholarship almost 
uniformly addresses the current system’s failures and inadequacies, pointing to barriers to 
mobility and the need for reform. Common framings include political gain outweighing 
humanitarian need, moral bankruptcy, ‘Fortress Europe,’ and ‘crisis’ narratives that suggest 
obstacles of insurmountable weight. Migration research is pregnant with resignation, brimming 
with a fascination of failed frameworks.  3
     This thesis takes a different approach, seeking to learn from the examples of coordination that 
do exist, and consider what different approaches to mobility signify. The issues of forced 
migration and access to territory are as far-reaching and diverse as the communities they address, 
but at their core lie similar considerations of movement and transnational alignment. Examining 
trends within existing literature relevant to these topics provides insight, as well as 
recommendations for future research.  
     This literature review focuses on three specific streams of scholarship salient to academic 
work on migrant mobility: routes of migration, restricted access to asylum, and the asymmetric 
interpretation of legal frameworks. It concludes with gaps in the scholarship, considered within 
the context of travel documents and humanitarianism.  
 
3 As evidenced by Huysmans (2002), Nagy (2016). 
10 
 II.I Migrant Routes: Paths to Europe 
     Relevant literature often addresses pathways of migration, focusing on the migrant journey. 
Scholars accord that routes are “highly adaptable and fluid,” subject to considerations of 
immigration policy, desired destination, travel documents, safety, and localized violence.  Some, 4
like Caitlin Katsiaficas (2016), argue that geopolitical factors in MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) affect the usage and policing of various routes. Differentiating between the Central 
Mediterranean Route, which travels from North Africa to Italy/Malta, and the Eastern 
Mediterranean Route, which travels through Turkey to Greece or other European states, she 
suggests that fluctuations in each route’s popularity correlate with events of unrest, such as those 
experienced in MENA over the course of the last decade. “The “Arab Spring has transformed 
EU’s immediate neighbourhood,” she writes. “In a short time, the Mediterranean Sea has become 
the new “Rio Grande.”  5
     Pedro Gois and Giulia Falchi (2017) agree, highlighting that following the Arab Spring, the 
Central Mediterranean route became the most heavily trafficked pathway to Europe. They further 
underscore the connection to political instability by asserting that “the flows increased after 
Muammar Gaddafi regime’s decision to force out most of the 40,000 sub-Saharan immigrants 
living there, who had no choice but to head to Europe via Libya.”  6
     Scholars focus not only on geopolitical factors of migrant routes but also on considerations of 
safety, often addressing the dangers associated with human smugglers. Mollie Gerver (2016) 
4 Caitlin Katsiaficas, “Asylum Seeker and Migrant Flows in the Mediterranean Adapt Rapidly to 
Changing Conditions,” 2016. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Pedro Gois and Giulia Falchi, “The Third Way. Humanitarian Corridors in Peacetime as a (local) Civil 
Society Response to a EU’s Common Failure” (2017), 63. 
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 calls human smugglers  the "the primary agents bringing refugees to safety,” but suggests that 7
they pose uniquely dangerous and tempting challenges to forced migrants.  Gois and Falchi 8
identify this danger by explaining that smugglers often put migrants on “unseaworthy fishing 
boats, or even small rubber dinghies, which are much overloaded and thus prone to capsizing.” 
Philippe Fargues and Anna Di Bartolomeo (2015) call the boats "rusty,"  while author and 9
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) Goodwill Ambassador Khaled 
Hosseini describes “bodies crammed together, waves towering overhead, night skies so dark you 
can’t tell where sky ends and sea begins.”  10
    Scholarship has focused on the human toll of those conditions, the enormity of it all. In the 
first half of 2018, 1,500 migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean.  This came years after 11
the 2013 Lampedusa tragedy, in which a ship sank near Italy and killed 368 of the 500 people on 
board. Shortly after, Italy responded with ​Mare Nostrum​, a search operation meant to rescue 
drowning migrants, but in 2015, it was discontinued so as not to be seen, in the words of 
European Council on Foreign Relations' Mattia Toaldo, as “a large pull factor for migration.”12
Scholars assert that Lampedusa and others were not isolated incidents, suggesting that migrants 
still risk death by drowning because smugglers operate through networks of deception. As 
articulated by Tuesday Reitano and Peter Tinti (2015):  
Smugglers universally trade on rumours, fears, inconsistencies and the illusion of trust. 
The more vulnerable the migrant feels, the more likely he is to recruit a smuggler, and the 
7  Human smuggling is distinct from human trafficking in that is is transportation-based, not 
coercion-based.  
8 ​Mollie Gerver, "The EU's Operation Sophia Has Failed to Make Conditions Safer for Refugees." (2016). 
9 Philippe Fargues and Anna Di Bartolomeo, “Drowned Europe,” (2015), 5. 
10 Khaled Hosseini, "Desperate Journeys - Refugees and Migrants Arriving in Europe and at Europe's 
Borders,” (2018). 
11 ​United Nations. "UNHCR Sounds Alarm as Mediterranean Sea Deaths Pass 1,500 Mark."  
12 Mattia Toaldo, “Migrations Through and From Libya: A Mediterranean Challenge” (2015), 5. 
12 
 higher the price he is likely to agree to pay. Smugglers recruit by emphasising the sense  
of urgency: ‘Go now, or they will build a wall and you won’t be able to pass there any  
more,’ they may say, for example, to the potential migrant. They will amplify or  
misrepresent inconsistencies in EU policies, playing on fears and portraying themselves  
as saviours – that they are the only hope that a migrant will have to reach his destination  
safely.  13
 
     Existing literature therefore highlights vulnerability and exploitation as reasons that migrants 
traverse dangerous paths to Europe. But why travel illegally at all? The following section 
explores illegal travel as an imperative, and the need for humanitarian travel documents through 
an exploration of restricted access to asylum.  
 
II.II Increased Restriction: The Need for Facilitated Movement 
     A second strand of scholarship focuses largely on the fact that few legal routes to entry exist. 
Although the UNHCR calls third-country settlement one of its three durable solutions for 
refugees (along with voluntary repatriation and local integration), and the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees enumerates the right to apply for asylum, scholars suggest that 
neither affordance provides the requisite protection. Susanna Trotta (2017) explains in her 
analysis of safe European passage that resettlement schemes only benefit "small numbers of 
refugees," and that they only apply to those whose refugee status has already been "recognised 
by the national authority or the UNHCR."  Global trends support Trotta’s assertion: in 2017, 14
13 Tuesday Reitano and Peter Tinti, “Survive and Advance: The Economics of Smuggling Refugees and 
Migrants into Europe,” (2015), 5. 
14 Susanna Trotta, “Safe and Legal Passages to Europe: A Case Study of Faith-Based Humanitarian 
Corridors to Italy” (2017), 1. 
13 
 UNHCR recorded 1.19 million submissions for resettlement, but only 65,109 departures, 
translating roughly to a five percent rate of resettlement.  15
     Legal routes to safe territory are sparse for refugees desiring resettlement and also for asylum 
seekers.  Ulla Iben Jensen (2014) explains that although the Common European Asylum System 16
(CEAS) requires asylum seekers to present themselves on the territory, border, or tranzit zones of 
Member States, EU law requires visas for citizens of over 100 nations. Jensen asserts that most 
prospective asylum seekers hail from countries with visa requirements, and that the law therefore 
creates a “prerequisite for seeking asylum” that encourages illegal entry.  The European Union 17
Agency for Fundamental Rights' 2014 report reaches a similar conclusion, stating that “although 
Article 18 of the Charter guarantees the right to asylum, EU law does not provide for ways to 
facilitate the arrival of asylum seekers…[who therefore] have to cross the border in an irregular 
manner.”   18
     A substantial body of literature suggests that not only must migrants resort to illegal entry 
because of inadequate legal protection, but also because states increasingly and intentionally 
restrict access to asylum. This shift signals a changing paradigm, one that moves away from 
humanitarian concern and towards what Trotta (2017) describes as “the politics of protection.”  19
15 United Nations. "Resettlement Fact Sheet 2017." 
16 ​Refugees and asylum seekers are both individuals escaping persecution, but asylum seekers appeal for 
protection when on the territory of the country from which they seek protection, whereas refugees apply 
from abroad. 
17 Ulla Iben Jensen, “Humanitarian Visas: Option or Obligation,” (2014) 3.  
18 European Agency for Fundamental Rights. “Fundamental Rights: Challenges and Achievements in 
2014,” 35.  
19 Trotta, 4.  
14 
      In recent years, states have begun prioritizing “sovereign exceptionalism”  over the liberal 20
norms of previously accepted and ratified frameworks.  In their 2008 study on asylum practices 21
in Europe and Australia, Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz advance two theories to explain 
this change: the externalization of asylum and the securitization of asylum. Hyndman and 
Mountz describe the externalization of asylum as a process through which states work to prevent 
migrants from lodging asylum applications on their territory, holding that this simultaneously 
“elides and divides foreign migrants and domestic systems of legal protection.”  Alexander 22
Betts (2004) writes of a similar dynamic, discussing externalization as policies “aimed at 
de-territorializing the provision of protection to refugees in such a way that temporary protection 
and the processing of asylum claims take place outside of the given nation-state.”   23
     Externalization of asylum works in tandem with securitization, which Hyndman and Mountz 
suggest represents a shift from “refugee protection to prioritizing the protection of national 
security interests.”  Other scholars document this same dynamic. Vicki Squire (2009) writes that 24
state protection for displaced people “has been constructed as a ‘problem’ or ‘threat’ that 
necessitates intensified controls.”  Alexander Betts and Jean-François Durieux (2007) echo a 25
similar sentiment, arguing that tying migration to security concerns “limit[s]  the ability of 
traditional resettlement countries to resettle groups or even individuals of certain nationalities.”  26
20 ​Conceptualized here as a focus on state interest prioritized over international concerns or frameworks. 
21 Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz, “Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the 
Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe,” (2008), 250.  
22 Ibid, 549.  
23 Alexander Betts, “The International Relations of the “New” Extraterritorial Approaches to Refugee 
Protection: Explaining the Policy Initiatives of the UK Government and UNHCR,” (2004), 59. 
24 Hyndman and Mountz, “Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the Externalization of 
Asylum by Australia and Europe,” (2008), 253.  
25 Vicki Squire,  ​The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum​, (2009), 9.  
26 Alexander Betts and Jean-François Durieux, “Convention Plus as a Norm-Setting Exercise,” (2007), 
527. 
15 
      In his 2006 work on the UNHCR and its relationship with global politics, Gil Loescher refers 
to states politicizing their commitments international frameworks as “the crisis of refugee  
protection’  But how does this happen? Academics like Oxford’s Monish Bhatia suggest that 27
intentional messaging disguises “restrictionist policies and sheer political 
inaction...overlook[ing] the escalation of border controls and policing measures to keep the 
‘other’ out.”   28
     In this way the externalization and securitization of asylum disguise anti-immigrant sentiment 
in concerns of national security, executed through messaging that paints refugees as dangerous, 
illegal, or undeserving of protection. One contributing factor is rhetoric that lumps different 
types of immigrants together. Hyndman and Mountz argue that public conflation of refugees, 
economic migrants, terrorists, and human smugglers strips individual people of identity and 
makes them “re-subjectified as groups.”  This lineation complicates access to protection since 29
different groups are granted different legal affordances. An economic migrant, for example, 
migrates voluntarily and is therefore not eligible for refugee resettlement or claims of asylum. 
However, as explained by Stephan Scheel and Vicki Squire in their 2014 study of illegal rhetoric 
and refugee populations, this very conflation allows for the idea of “the bogus asylum seeker,” a 
conception of forced migrants as voluntary immigrants “imbued with dangerous or excessive 
agency based on the suspected ‘abuse’ of the asylum system.”  30
27 Gil Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy” (2006), 
352. 
28 Gois and Falchi, 62. 
29 Hyndman and Mountz, 258.  
30 Stephan Scheel and Vicki Squire, “"Forced Migrants as ‘Illegal’ Migrants” (2014), 194. 
16 
      What results is a pervasive mindset that many forced migrants are not forced at all, and that, 
as such, states fall under no obligation to protect them. A “hierarchy of deserving” emerges, 
allowing governments to turn away those viewed as less worthy of protection, either by 
suggesting economic drain or danger.  Even for migrants with verified and valid claims of 31
persecution, associations to sovereign encroachment and national threat prevail. Scholars suggest 
that this allows governments to restrict access to protection while avoiding international censure. 
Bernd Parusel and Jan Schneider tie this dynamic to travel documents in their 2012 study, stating 
that “visa policy and visa practices serve as control mechanisms when it comes to regulating the 
entry of foreigners into the national territory. Thus, they are also instruments of security.”  32
     In discussing limited access to entry, restricted policies, and dangerous messaging, the 
existing literature suggests a need for facilitated access to safe territory, perhaps manifest as 
travel documents. The following section addresses scholarship on legal frameworks through 
which this facilitation could operate, focusing on ambiguities and subjective interpretation.  
 
II.III Asymmetric Interpretation and Soft Law Frameworks 
     ​A third strand of research on migrant mobility focuses on the lack of clarity in legal 
structures. Although a patchwork arrangement of intra-European regulation governs movement 
in and out of Europe and therefore the administration of travel documents such as visas, scholars 
hold that inconsistencies and vague wordings inhibit continent-wide coordination. 
     In discussing legal ambiguity, the literature largely focuses on the European Visa Code, 
which outlines procedures for issuing travel documents in EU territory. Scholars draw attention 
31 Trotta, 10-11. 
32 Bernd Parusel and Jan Schneider, “The Impact of Visa Policy on Migration Control,” (2012), 5. 
17 
 to Articles 19 and 25 of the European Visa Code,  which describe the ability of states to issue 33
visas on “humanitarian grounds.”  Jensen (2014) argues that word choices in the regulation 34
cause confusion, citing the fact that Article 19 holds that states “may” issue humanitarian visas 
while Article 25 says that states “shall” issue humanitarian visas. “It would indeed be preferable 
to have the relationship between Article 19 (4) and 25 (1) clarified in the Visa Code,” she writes, 
adding that this slight difference holds heavy implications for “international obligations.”  35
     Jensen points also to several ambiguities, such as Article 25’s mandate that a state shall issue 
humanitarian visas when it “considers it necessary” ( suggesting, without explanation, some 
degree of discretion), the fact that the Visa Code never explains how to lodge or process 
humanitarian visa applications, and the oddity that the phrase “‘humanitarian grounds’ remains 
undefined in binding EU legal instruments.”   Violeta Moreno Lax (2008) writes that “the 36
question of physical access to protection is ambiguously regulated in EU law,”  while Betts 37
(2008) argues that states are left to “define their own standards based on their own interpretations 
of legal norms.”   38
     Existing literature suggests that ambiguities impede the “uniform application and 
interpretation” of regulations governing visa issuance, which, in the words of Claudia Finotelli 
and Giuseppe Sciortino (2013), allows for “a wide level of discretionary power for European 
33 This study will address and explain legal frameworks in depth in subsequent sections.  
34 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009. 
35 Jensen, 15. 
36 Ibid, 16, 2, 0. 
37 Violeta Morena Lax, Must EU Borders Have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of Schengen 
Visas and Carriers Sanctions with EU Member States Obligations to Provide International Protection to 
Refugees, (2008), 318. 
38 Alexander Betts, “Towards a Soft Law Framework for the Protection of Vulnerable Irregular 
Migrants,” (2010), 11. 
18 
 member states.  Betts (2010) holds that this very discretion means that states “lack sources of 39
normative and operational support in relation to reconciling their own migration concerns with 
upholding their human rights obligations.”   In other words, the asymmetric interpretation of 40
legal frameworks hinders coordination and, in some case, can handicap humanitarian efforts.  
     Some scholars suggest that the international community should address this shortcoming not 
with an overhaul of the legal system but rather by establishing interpretive norms. Betts (2010) 
champions the “soft law” approach of creating a framework that ties regulation to 
universally-agreed upon norms of enforcement. Filling protection gaps, he argues, requires “a) 
an authoritative consensus on th​e application of t​hese instruments to the situation of vulnerable 
migrants and b) a clear division of responsibility between international organisations for the 
operational implementation of such guidelines.”  The European Council on Refugees and Exiles 41
also endorses a soft law approach. At a January 2014 conference, it called for “EU guidelines on 
a common approach” to Visa Code application, suggesting that such a framework would promote 
“legal and safe access to the EU for protection purposes.”  42
     In sum, existing literature points to ambiguities and inconsistencies within European 
regulation to argue that individual states exercise discretion and unique interpretations when 
engaging with the same laws. It additionally posits that increased access to protection is not a 
matter of creating a new system, but of altering understanding and expression of the current one. 
39 Philip Hanke, Marek Wieruszewski, and Marion Panizzon, ""The ‘spirit of the Schengen Rules’, the 
Humanitarian Visa, and Contested Asylum Governance in Europe – The Swiss Case," (2018), 6.; Claudia 
Finotelli and Giuseppe Sciortino, “Through the Gates of the Fortress: European Visa Policies and the 
Limits of Immigration Control,” (2013), 85.  
40 Betts (2010), 11. 
41 Ibid, 5. 
42 Jensen, 25.  
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 Legal frameworks exist, but they exist ambiguously, and operate within a system increasingly 
characterized by restriction.  
 
II.IV ​Research Gaps and Steps Forward 
     ​Current scholarship on mobility and forced migration contributes important considerations of 
migrant routes, the securitization and externalization of asylum, and disparate interpretations of 
legal frameworks. Taken together, the literature adroitly expresses the need for facilitated 
mobility. However, it focuses on the failures of migrant mobility rather than the factors that 
could lead to its success. This presents a glaring gap in the scholarship.  
     In employing negative frames of analysis, scholars isolate and underscore vital shortcomings 
of the refugee regime. But when scholarship gives undue attention to stilted mobility, it 
simultaneously removes active considerations of facilitated mobility, resulting in persistent and 
inaccurate beliefs that refugees can only access territory through formal resettlement schemes 
(which only benefit approximately 1% of the globally displaced population), or through illicit 
means such as smuggling.  The subsequent focus either veers from overcoming obstacles to 43
mobility, or seeks to alter the status quo without considering travel documents, a potent, 
logistically feasible, and historically-proven tool with which to do so. Both results are 
problematic, and comprise an important shortcoming of the literature.  
     Having established both salient trends of scholarship and their relevant drawbacks, this thesis 
now turns to a case study of the first issuance of refugee travel documents, an analysis of 
mobility and passports in Europe following World War 1.  
43 Zuzana Cepla, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Refugee Resettlement” (2019). 
20 
  
Section III. Mobility and the Nansen Era (Case Study I) 
  
     Interwar Europe provides a logical starting point for discussions of mobility, since that era 
represents the first example of travel documents issued to refugees at a mass and international 
level. As argued in this section, European countries worked together to facilitate refugee 
mobility for three key reasons, all borne of wartime considerations: geopolitical pressures, 
national interest, and perception of a common enemy.  
 
III.I Russian Refugees and the Passport Question 
 
     Prior to the first World War, discussions of migrant mobility revolved largely around 
statelessness, spurred by an exodus of Russian citizens. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, ensuing 
civil war, and the 1921 famine all created massive political and social unrest in the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), creating mass westward migration. As explained 
by migration scholar James C. Hathaway (1984), “some individuals left their homeland in order 
to avert material devastation and famine; others fled because they held political convictions 
fundamentally at odds with those of the Bolsheviks."   44
     The exodus of Russians fleeing to Europe resulted in a displacement of 1.5 million 
individuals, and comprised the first large flow of migrants considered refugees in the twentieth 
century.  Although exiles have existed so long as states have, the Russian situation presented 45
mass displacement at levels not previously seen, complicated by a post-armistice Europe 
44 James C. Hathaway, “The Evolution Of Refugee Status In International Law: 1920–1950," (2984), 
350-351. 
45 Alessandra Roversi, “The Evolution of the Refugee Regime and Institutional Responses: Legacies from 
the Nansen Period,” (2003), 22-23.  
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 “drained by war; stirred by political tensions; and exhausted of capacities to provide adequate 
relief.”  46
     In 1921, the All Russian Central Executive Committee, the ranking legislating body of the 
RSFSR, revoked the citizenship of all peoples who had lived abroad for more than five years, or 
who had left Russian territory after November 7, 1917 sans governmental consent. Stripped of 
valid passports and therefore the ability to move between countries and access employment, 
hundreds of thousands became stateless and slipped into squalid  poverty.  47
     The importance of state-issued travel documents cannot easily be overstated. Documents like 
passports not only grant governments the ability to regulate transit and labor, but also allow 
individuals to prove identity and nationality, receive state and diplomatic protection, establish 
domicile, and enter into contracts for medical, social, and economic assistance. Crucially, travel 
documents allow the holder to return to the country of issuance. Without these benefits, refugees 
could barely enter into society, let alone subsist.  48
     At the time of the Russian diaspora, the need for passports was relatively new. Prior to WW1, 
identity documents were not commonplace, with passports “considered superfluous” and 
restricted to “diplomats who claimed special treatment.”  Holocaust historian Michael R. 49
Marrus addressed this dynamic in 1985, noting that with the exception of government officials, 
“"throughout the nineteenth century [and into the twentieth] there were no serious administrative 
impediments to the movement of persons between states.”  50
46 Ibid, 23. 
47 Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill,”Misfits:" Canada and the Nansen Passport,” (1994), 283. 
48 Ibid, 282. 
49 Otto Hieronymi, “The Nansen Passport: A Tool of Freedom of Movement and of Protection,” (2003), 
43. 
50 Ibid, 44. 
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      In 1914, France, Germany, and Italy made passports mandatory for entry, moving to monitor 
their borders in the midst of war. Others followed suit in the name of national security; when the 
war ended, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles extended this practice by stating that signatories must 
"secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit.”  But not everyone was 51
convinced that the securitization of borders benefitted a healing continent. Italian diplomat 
Egidio Reale wrote in 1931 that during the war, passports were widely “condemned as despotic 
and as an unnecessary barrier to the freedom of communications,” and that many “reasonable 
persons” hoped that ending the war meant ending passport usage.  On October 21, 1920, the 52
Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit’s Passport Conference 
convened in Paris, and wrote to the League of Nations that it was:  
Convinced that the many difficulties affecting personal relations between the peoples of 
various countries constitute a serious obstacle to the resumption of normal intercourse  
and to the economic recovery of the world; Being of the opinion, further, that the  
legitimate concern of every Government for the safeguarding of its security and rights  
prohibits, for the time being, the total abolition of restrictions and that complete return to  
pre-war conditions which the Conference hopes, nevertheless, to see gradually  
re-established in the near future.  53
 
     The wartime system of passports remained nonetheless, complicating efforts to assist stateless 
people and cementing the need for refugee travel documents.  
 
 
 
51 The Avalon Project. The Treaty of Versailles. Article 23, Section e. 
52 Egidio Reale, “The Passport Question,” (1931), 506. 
53 League of Nations Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit. “Passport 
Conference Preparatory Documents” (1925).  
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 III.II The Nansen Passport 
     Against this backdrop the young League of Nations in 1921, having not even celebrated its 
two-year birthday, called upon Fridtjof​ ​Nansen, a Norwegian scientist, diplomat and polar 
explorer. Nansen had previously worked with the League of Nations to repatriate Russian 
prisoners of war and combat famine; the Nobel Committee later recognized these efforts by 
awarding him the Nobel Peace Prize.   54
     Following Nansen’s initial repatriation success and faced again with complicated issues 
involving Russia and displacement, the League of Nations in 1921 appointed Nansen High 
Commissioner for Russian Refugees, and presented him with a 3-pronged mandate: to create 
legal status for refugees and attempt repatriation, to facilitate access to employment in host 
countries or new ones, and to coordinate existing philanthropic efforts. With these goals in mind, 
Nansen moved to engineer a travel document for stateless persons, the first ever “legal 
instrument used for the international protection of refugees.  55
     ​On July 5, 1922, Nansen convened an intergovernmental conference in Geneva, called  
the Arrangement with Regard to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees.   56
The conference created the first legal instrument of “international scope” to provide protection to 
refugees​, a travel document that prevented deportation to the country of origin and allowed 
movement between states for the primary purpose of finding employment.  Initially adopted by 57
16 signatories (Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Latvia, Bolivia, Roumania, Union of 
South Africa, Switzerland, Norway, Italy, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Guatemala, Austria, and 
54 "The Nobel Peace Prize 1922," Nobelprize.org. 
55 United Nations, “Nansen - a Man of Action and Vision.” 
56 Roversi, 24. 
57 ​Hathaway, 351. 
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 Greece) and drafted from proposals written by Nansen himself, the arrangement included 
guidelines for implementation and a template detailed to include, among other things, date and 
place of birth, surnames of both parents, occupation, former and present residence, as well as 
descriptions of hair, eyes, facial structures, and "special peculiarities."  58
     The representatives of the conference together agreed upon nine conditions of 
implementation, including languages of print (French and the native tongue of the respective 
country of issuance), a timeline of yearly renewal, processes for transit visas, and the stipulation 
that certificates be distributed free of charge “except in the event of legal provision to the 
contrary.” In addition, identity documents were not to violate domestic immigration laws of 
respective states, and they did not afford automatic re-entry to the country of issuance (unlike 
national passports) “without special authorisation of that state.”  59
     More notable than the intricacies of the agreement, for the purposes of this study, are the 
conditions in which they were struck. Not only did the representatives agree to create a uniform 
identity document for refugees , but they did so unanimously, without a single dissenting vote. 60
Additionally, representatives recommended adoption by the states at the conference, other 
members of the League of Nations, and even those who were not members. Signatories 
underscored this push for global alignment and shared responsibility by writing that, “in view of 
the urgency of the matter,” all states were invited to participate, and that they should notify the 
League of Nations’ Secretary-General with details about implementation “as soon as possible.”   61
58 ​United Nations. "Arrangement with Respect to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian 
Refugees." 
59 Ibid. 
60 ​At this point in time, the identity papers were meant for Russian refugees only. 
61 United Nations. "Arrangement with Respect to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees. 
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      Fridtjof Nansen died in 1930, and the League soon after established the Nansen International 
Office for Refugees, a body that would oversee the protection and documentation of forced 
migrants.  Under Nansen’s scheme, approximately 450,000 war-torn people from various states 62
received legal recognition and freedom of mobility, eventually acknowledged and honored by 
over 50 countries.  The Nansen Office administered passports until 1939, when responsibility 63
for identity documents switched to the newly-formed Intergovernmental Committee on 
Refugees, an organization created to handle post-war migration and refugees fleeing Nazi 
Germany.  What started as an initiative for Russian refugees expanded, evolving in response to 64
global pressures.  
     The 1922 arrangement makes clear the terms of refugee travel documents, the scope of 
application, and the depth of support, but it neglects to shed light onto why, for the first time in 
recorded history, the global community came together to forge monumental and multilateral 
solidarity with forced migrants. To understand why this movement succeeded where and when it 
did, it is fruitful to analyze a related instance in which the Nansen initiative failed: Canada. 
     The Canadian case seems initially anomalous to this discussion, given that the present 
analysis has hitherto only discussed European states.  However, Canada’s history is worth 65
exploring given its immense and sustained resistance to refugee travel documents at the time. To 
discussions of conditions allowing for success, as well as alignment, Canada’s extreme 
non-compliance proves illuminating. 
62 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
63 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, ​The United Nations, A Very Short Introduction​, (2008), 127; Kaprielian-Churchill, 
285. 
64 Hieronymi, 40. 
65 South Africa and Guatemala are exceptions; it is not immediately apparent why they were signatories, 
and future research should explore their seats at the table.  
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 III.III Nansen and Canadian Dissent 
     Today, the country of Canada is widely considered a model for refugee assistance and 
resettlement, and was awarded in 1986 the UNHCR Nansen Medal for outstanding service to 
refugees. High Commissioner Jean-Pierre Hocke called the honor "proof that Canadians 
recognize that only through a more equitable distribution of the world's wealth and resources can 
peace and prosperity be achieved for all humanity."   66
     Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill (1994) notes that Canada was not always a haven for refugees, as 
it  "steadfastly refused to recognize the Nansen Passport."  Canada’s history of exclusion began 67
long before its rejection of refugee identity documents. From the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act, 
which imposed a $50 charge on Chinese immigrants entering the country, to the 1908 
Continuous Journey Regulation, which mandated that immigrants travel to Canada on a single 
through ticket (excluding people from countries to which no direct steamship service existed, 
i.e., India, Japan), legislation systematically restricted access to Canadian soil.  Often these 68
tactics involved identity documents: “[W]ell before World War I, Canada recognized the 
growing importance of the passport and passed legislation requiring immigrants, especially those 
classified as "undesirables," like Asians, to show bona fide passports.”   69
     This history was not entirely forgotten when the issue of Nansen passports arose. In 1924 
Nansen protection was extended to Armenians and soon recognized by 38 countries (with 54 
recognizing protection for Russian refugees).  In the face of this seemingly global consensus, 70
66 ​Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill, 281 
67 Ibid. 
68 Lindsay Van Dyk, "Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21." 
69 Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill, 283. 
70 Ibid, 284-285. 
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 Canada dissented and refused to align. Government documents and archived letters sent between 
Nansen, members of the League of Nations, and Canadian officials provide insight into exactly 
why Canada proved unwilling to accept its share of responsibility.  
     A 1924 letter from the Canadian External Affairs office to League of Nations Secretary 
General Sir Eric Drummond articulated Canada’s position clearly:  
It is the opinion of the Canadian authorities that while the issuing State might be quite 
willing to receive back an Armenian who is physically and mentally fit and had not a  
serious criminal record, that no State would be prepared to take the insane and physically 
defective, whether suffering from a contagious disease or otherwise, whose return would 
involve questions of public maintenance during the remainder of a lifetime. As the  
majority of persons to be deported from Canada would be of the class referred to, the  
present attitude is considered to be necessary for the protection of the various public  
authorities of the Dominion.  71
 
     Canada averted loyalty to Nansen protection by focusing on returnability, a principle that 
affords governments the right to return ‘alien immigrants’ (defined as anyone without Canadian 
naturalization or domicile) to the country of last residence if that person is deemed, within a five 
year period of entry, “undesirable.” The idea was that migrants who became public charges could 
be deported, and that countries of last residence would agree to and facilitate the process.  
     To Canada’s chagrin, this provision was not possible with early identity documents. To allow 
returnability was, rather, “to negate the very spirit and purpose of the Nansen Passport,” to build 
into mechanisms of entry forced mechanisms of exit.  ​Even so, Canada remained steadfast in its 72
commitment to the principle, with Assistant Deputy Minister of Immigration F. C. Blair 
71 Ibid, 286. 
72 Ibid, 289. 
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 expressing by letter that “if states were unwilling to risk the return of a few refugees who might 
become deportable from Canada, their best course was to keep them all.”  73
     Although Canada rejected the Nansen network, the network did not give up on Canada. In 
1926, the League of Nations invited J. Bruce Walker, Director of Canadian Immigration, to 
attend an intergovernmental conference on identity documents. Walker traveled with a directive 
to not accept Nansen passports as long as they remained “one-way document[s], whether that 
document is in the hands of people we want or people we don't want.” This sentiment was 
reiterated in a cable message sent to Walker from Canadian officials: “Make clear at 
Intergovernmental Conference our readiness accept [sic] such refugees as we can absorb but only 
on condition that country sending them agrees return misfits. Stop. Deported six Russians last 
fiscal year."  74
     At the 1926 intergovernmental conference, signatories as diverse as Luxembourg, Cuba, 
Estonia, Sweden, India, Bulgaria, Finland, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 
conceded to accept the principle of returnability by endorsing a return period of one year.  75
Walker signed the arrangement, but unlike most other signatories, he returned to a state that 
refused to ratify it. Historians suggests that his signature greatly confused the international 
community and Canadian international relations, largely because, as articulated by a memo to 
External Affairs Undersecretary of State Dr. O.D.Skelton, Canada had not “"the slightest 
73 Ibid, 289. 
74 Ibid, 285-286. 
75 Cuba and India seemingly stand out as as anomalies; unlike the other listed states, both hold 
geographically distance from refugee flows (though some fled Russia and sought asylum in Asia), and 
India was still a colony at the time. As such, it is not immediately clear why these states participated in 
the negotiations. Unfortunately, unlike with Canada, the literature does not include a rich history of these 
countries and their participation. Both states would present fascinating case studies to pursue, given 
sufficient data. 
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 intention of either issuing or accepting such a certificate, it is hard to understand why the 1926 
Arrangement was signed.”   76
     Rejecting the agreed upon time period, Canada demanded that the return period be extended 
to five years. The International Labor Organization (ILO) worked in collaboration with the 
League of Nations to comply, and, in a last-ditch effort, began issuing Nansen passports to 
Armenian refugees of exceptional health and employability residing in Greece, with five-year 
return visas from the Greek government. Even with these generous allowances, “Canadian 
officials continued to refuse these applicants; they found other grounds for rejection.”   77
     Canada failed to attend the 1928 or 1933 intergovernmental conferences on the international 
status of refugees, signaling distance from the cause and from Walker’s signature. The rejection 
of Nansen passports is obvious, but the rationale behind it is less clear, making it necessary to 
infer the reasons that drove resistance. Historical context suggests that Canada’s resistance to 
compliance with international alignment likely stemmed from two interrelated factors: 
geography and domestic focus.  
     European countries worked together to process and address the refugee situation partially 
because they had to; at the time, Canadian Deputy Minister of Immigration WJ. Egan even 
acknowledged the importance  of "reliev[ing] European states" of the pressing burden.78 79
Geographically proximate to zones of conflict, Europe had little choice but to create mechanisms 
of support for the refugees showing up at their borders. The same cannot be said for Canada, 
which quickly adopted an isolationist model of foreign affairs. From strictly pragmatic and 
76 Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill, 287. 
77 Ibid, 290. 
78 Though he acknowledged the importance of lessening the burden, he did not act to do so.  
79 Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill, 288.  
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 political angles, isolation made sense: with distance and oceans between its domestic territory 
and distant areas of conflict, Canada could remove itself from global responsibility in a way that 
European countries could not.  
     Physical distance from the problem allowed Canadian officials to suggest that its international 
obligation to the League of Nations did not encompass resettling refugees driven from conflicts it 
did nothing to create. In essence, Canada framed European problems as, well, European, and 
therefore not Canada’s burden. As Europe juggled the specter of communism and threats to 
global stability (as will be discussed soon), Canada exercised extreme caution “about being 
drawn into spheres of international responsibility which might embroil the country in collective 
military action or entail financial cost.”  It was easier to leave Europe to its own problems.  80
     Underlying this rationale is a tension between global humanitarian obligation and national 
interest. In Canada, many found the idea of honoring international commitments and growing 
local economies incompatible. Thomas Moore, the ILO’s Canadian ambassador, fed this 
narrative by voicing concern that “waves” of refugees would lower the national standard of 
living by injecting the workforce with employees willing to work in menial jobs with poor 
wages. As a result, labor unions felt threatened by immigrants and advocated against their 81
acceptance. “Scorned as international beggars, refugees were thus denounced as probable drains 
on the country’s economic resources.”   82
      In an April 1921 House of Commons debate, Minister of Immigration and Colonization 
James Alexander Calder bluntly expressed his government’s approach: “"We are not in such 
80 Ibid, 293. 
81 Ibid, 296. 
82 Ibid, 295. 
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 need of immigrants from central Europe."  This firm statement implies that the Canadian 83
approach was to prioritize national interest over global interest, viewing migrants through 
cost-benefit analyses that ignored humanitarian emergencies to focus on domestic economies. 
This approach differs from that of Europe, where refugees posed both domestic and international 
problems; it was impossible to differentiate between the two.  
         When assessing the positive conditions allowing for successful refugee mobility, 
considering a negative case proves fruitful. Canadian dissent illustrates the importance of 
geography, as well as the role of domestic agendas. With European states, national interest 
aligned closely with international obligation, making action both desirable and necessary. In the 
Canadian case, the refugee issue was not in national interest, nor did it align with international 
obligation, largely because geography and physical distance weakened the sense of 
responsibility.  In returning to European analysis, the lessons of Canada remain relevant, and 
suggest that all calculus of necessary and sufficient conditions for mobile success must include 
acknowledgement of geography and national interest.  
     In sum, the Nansen passports of the early twentieth century exist as the first mass example of 
travel documents deployed on a humanitarian basis for refugees. Spearheaded by Nansen and the 
League of Nations, this initiative displayed the international community’s ability to share 
responsibility and exhibit meaningful solidarity. The over 50 nations that recognized these 
documents helped provide protection to an estimated 450,000 people, including Russian artists 
Marc Chagall, Igor Stravinsky, Sergey Rachmaninov, and Anna Pavolva.  Although a broad 84
83 Ibid, 295. 
84 "The Nobel Peace Prize 1922," Nobelprize.org. 
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 coalition of countries supported the initiative, Canada rejected the system, using the principle of 
returnability as an “effective smokescreen,” to shoulder responsibility.   85
     Though the Nansen system originated nearly a century ago, its lessons hold great relevance 
today. To modern discussions of refugee mobility, the Nansen legacy provides insight into 
motivating factors through a rare example of success. The subsequent section assesses the 
conditions that contributed to the proliferation of Nansen passports. 
 
III.IV Nansen Passports: Conditions for Success 
     The League of Nations was young when it tasked Nansen with its mandate nearly 100 years 
ago, and documentation of the exact rationale behind the initiative, international attitudes about 
the project, and state-specific negotiations are scarce. Most scholarship addressing Nansen 
passports focuses on the scheme itself rather than the specificities of its conception, so lacking a 
formal base of data, this analysis grounds itself in critical engagement with existing written 
histories as well as extrapolation based on evidence from social and political landscapes. 
     Three distinct factors contributed to the success of Nansen’s scheme: geography, national 
interest, and the perception of a common enemy. The League of Nations did not approach 
Nansen out of the goodness of its heart, but rather because Russian refugees presented an issue 
that simply could not be ignored. When the International Red Cross Committee appealed to the 
League of Nations in 1921 to find a solution to Russian refugees mobility, they asked for action 
on behalf of “Russian refugees scattered throughout Europe ​without legal protection or 
representation​” [emphasis added]. They did not, to entertain a counterfactual, request protection 
85 Kaprielian-Churchill, 289. 
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 for “refugees scattered throughout Europe with fear of persecution” or “who are experiencing 
human rights abuses.” Hathaway (1984) writes that the Red Cross’ wording implies not a 
humanitarian duty but “an obligation of international justice.”  
     This duty was time bound and specific, growing from Europe’s post-war position.   86
As articulated by journalist Karl E. Meyer (2009):  
A stricken Europe could neither cope with, nor comprehend, the forces by the 1917 
Bolshevik seizure of power in St. Petersburg. Seemingly overnight, an ancient empire  
collapsed, its reins grabbed by a factitious cabal of intellectuals persuaded that their very  
success confirmed the perfection of an absolutist ideology.   87
 
     Meyer’s words suggest an urgency tied to Europe’s wartime position, as well as a concern of 
magnitude. The sheer volume of the crisis demanded action. Reale attributes the eventual success 
of Nansen to these “special conditions of the problem,” mainly that “the Bolshevik Revolution 
had put two million Russians outside the law and deprived them of all civic rights.”  Nearing the 88
end of a devastating war, hurriedly moving towards peace and global reconstruction, European 
states thirsted for a stable global order, which the exodus of millions severely threatened. As 
Hathaway (1984) writes, the “withdrawal ​de jure ​by a State, whether via denaturalisation or the 
withholding of diplomatic facilities such as travel documents...results in a malfunction of the 
international system.” The Nansen passports were designed, in Hathaway’s parlance, to “correct 
this breakdown in the international order.”  89
     As such, the impetus behind refugee travel documents was structurally legal rather than moral 
or humanitarian. This stemmed largely from the definition of refugee, which at the time 
86 Canada’s dissent proves insightful once more: geographic isolation from the Russian revolution, the 
subsequent exodus, and related political destabilization meant that Canada was not forced to feel the 
pressures that gripped Europe.  
87 Karl E. Meyer, The Curious Life of the Lowly Passport, (2009), 74. 
88 Reale, 507. 
89 Hathaway, 358. 
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 conceptualized refugees as anyone physically outside their home nation and dispossessed of the 
protection of their government. “The purpose of refugee status conceived in juridical terms is to 
facilitate the international movement of persons who find themselves abroad and unable to 
migrate because no nation is prepared to assume responsibility for them” writes Hathaway.  90
     As the world had not previously experienced mass migration at a volume comparable with the 
outflux of Russian émigrés, there lacked widely-accepted, institutional definitions to the term 
refugee. As High Commissioner, Nansen established the following juridical definitions:  
Russian refugee: Any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy the protection of the  
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and who has not acquired any  
other nation. 
 
Armenian refugee: Any person of Armenian origin, formerly a subject of the Ottoman  
Empire, who does not enjoy the protection of the Government of the Turkish Republic  
and who has not acquired any other nationality.  91
 
     The specificity of this case cannot be ignored, and suggests that the non-humanitarian focus 
of this protection grew at least partially from an us vs. them dynamic. Travel documents were 
first made for Russian refugees, and then extended to Armenians. As such, the passports were 
“category-oriented,” ironically tied to definitive  and ill-flexible borders.  Before his death, 92 93
Nansen suggested expanding protection to various groups of Assyrians, Assyro- Chaldaeans, 
Ruthenians (who had previously lived in Eastern Europe's Galicia, now located in Ukraine), 
Montenegrins, Turks, Hungarians, and Jews. The League of Nations met Nansen’s proposal with 
90 Ibid, 349. 
91 Ibid, 353. 
92 In the first years of operation, beneficiaries were required to prove that they were in fact of Russian 
origin residing beyond the boundaries of the USSR, or were otherwise deemed ineligible.  
93 Laura Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” (2002). 
242. 
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 skepticism, and the belief that Nanasen had painted with too broad a brush. League of Nations 
rapporteur Nicolae Petresco-Comnène commented that:  
the mere fact that certain classes of persons are without the protection of any national  
Government is not sufficient to make them refugees; for on that theory all classes of  
persons without nationality would have to be included.  94
 
     Shortly thereafter, Nansen revoked his support for classifying Montenegrins as refugees, 
arguing that they were able to obtain passports in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, and were therefore not “under analogous conditions to those of the Armenian and 
Russian refugees.”   95
     The selection of countries  whose nationals (or ex-nationals, given displacement) received 96
travel documents was hardly random. Note the stringent focus on Soviet spheres (the Soviet 
Union and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic), and the fact that Nansen’s very system grew 
from their presence. The East and the West share a long history of mutual threat, both militarily 
and culturally. So when the USSR transformed into an increasingly aggressive communist 
system, Europe took notice. “In much of the capitalist West,” writes Meyer (2009), Russian 
revolution and extension was entirely “troublesome.”   97
     In the face of such a starting specter, institutionalizing mobility for Russian refugees 
represented not only an act of humanity, but an act of defiance against communism. Under 
94 Hathaway, 355. 
95 Ibid, 356.  
96 According to Hathaway (1984), the League of Nations extended its definitions at the 1928 
Intergovernmental Conference to include people who were Turkish, Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, or "any 
other person of Syrian or Kurdish origin” lacking protection or new nationality. In subsequent years, these 
definitions faced challenges from the international community. At a 1933 Intergovernmental Conference, 
for example, Czech and Polish delegates expressed discontent with the definitions, characterizing them as 
imprecise. The Chairman of the conference agreed that the definitions were “​imparfaites​,” but argued it 
was simpler to keep them given that governments had already incorporated them. 
97 Meyer, 75. 
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 Bolshevik repression, citizens were not afforded the right to passports or travel, and as such, the 
administration of such a document in Europe, particularly to people of Russian descent, was a 
display of “visible demonstration” against the communist system.  98
     This introduces another lesson of Nansen, tied but not twin with its specificity: common 
threat. United not always in policy but at least in democracy, Europe acknowledged the Russian 
threat and acted accordingly. Understanding that non-democratic regimes often deny citizens 
mobility, and wanting to distance itself from both wartime legacies and the communist East, 
Europe moved to remedy the dilemma of Russian refugees in a clear way: with unity, and against 
an ideological enemy. As explained by Hathaway (1984), “The reign of liberalism with its 
individualistic orientation and respect for self-determination led most European powers to permit 
essentially uncontrolled and unrestricted immigration”  99
    The previously discussed example of Canadian dissent bolsters this argument. Thousands of 
miles and time zones away, the ‘threat’ of communism resonated differently in Canada, watered 
down by the ocean between. Isolated from the conflict, Russian refugees were faceless, the rise 
of communism far from sight. This point bears great importance given that presumably, the same 
factors that allowed for success in Europe should be missing in Canada. Geography, national 
interest, and common enemy motivated European actions, but in Canada, refugees were not by 
default a domestic issue, nor was there as strong a perception of common enemy.  
     In sum, Nansen’s facilitated mobility resulted largely from geographic and geopolitical 
considerations (national interest and common enemy). Concerns regarding world order and 
communism played significant roles; one cannot ignore the fact that the Russian fallout was felt 
98 Hieronymi, 39. 
99 Hathaway, 348. 
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 in Europe​ and that the threat was existential ​to Europe​. Not assisting refugees would likely have 
escalated the threat, jeopardizing world order and further preventing European stability, 
extending wartime woes. In this way, the impetus was structural and self-serving, rather than 
moral or humanitarian. 
     Having assessed the Nansen scheme, this thesis now turns to a discussion of legal regulations 
and institutional bodies. When the Red Cross Committee and the League of Nations approached 
Nansen in an attempt to remedy the refugee issue, there existed no institutionalized mechanisms 
of mobility. Specific temporal context and the perception of threat allowed for Europe to create 
its own instruments, resulting in formative change not only with regard to the protection of 
refugees but also to their legal definitions. The subsequent decades exhibited marked change, 
rendering the modern landscape of international protection almost unrecognizable. The following 
section addresses the evolution of relevant legal frameworks and institutions, with a focus on 
mobility and territorial access.  
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Section IV. Evolution of Legal Frameworks and Institutional Landscapes 
  
     In the years following Nansen’s revolutionary scheme, refugee definitions and affordances 
continued to evolve. This section traces these evolutions by proceeding in four key parts. It 
begins with a discussion of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees before 
pivoting to the emergence of EU law and visa policy as it relates to refugees and mobility. It then 
considers the legal basis for refugee travel documents, before assessing ambiguity within legal 
frameworks, entertaining an illustrative case that displays the impact of vague language and 
state-specific interpretation.  
 
IV.I 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
 
    Heightened visibility and awareness of displacement in the wake of WW2 set the groundwork 
for a definitive, institutionalized framework regarding refugees. The framework materialized in 
1951, at the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Known also as the 1951 Refugee 
Convention (henceforth the Convention), the treaty exists as the cornerstone of international 
protection, a blueprint that defines the term refugee and outlines both the responsibilities of 
member states and the rights of displaced people. Stemming from Article 14 of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “everyone has the right to seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution,” the Convention centralized all previous 
instruments and regulation to provide a definitive codification of refugee rights and 
responsibilities.  100
100 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 14. 
39 
      As previously explained, prior to the Convention different agreements, conferences, and legal 
structures employed disparate definitions of refugees, often related to certain ethnic groups (i.e., 
Russian refugees, Armenian refugees). The Convention for the first time adopted a single and 
universal definition: A refugee is someone who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country.”  At the time of this writing, this classification 101
remains the dominant definition in legal, governmental, and humanitarian spheres.  
         The Convention not only defines who qualifies as a refugee, but also the affordances to 
which refugees are entitled. As such, “[t]he Convention is both a status and rights-based 
instrument and is underpinned by a number of fundamental principles, most notably 
non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulement.” ​ For the purposes of this study, the 102
last principle is most pertinent, as it relates to movement and safety. Non-refoulement flows from 
Article 33, which holds that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion.”  In other words, host countries may not return those seeking protection to 103
states in which their lives may be in danger.  
     The definition of a refugee and the principle of non-refoulement provide clear bases for 
refugee status and protection, but they do not provide mechanisms of mobility. Article 28 
101 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1.2. 
102 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 3.  
103 ​Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 33.1 
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 stipulates that contracting states shall "issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territory travel 
documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless compelling reasons of national 
security or public order otherwise require." Of note to the discussion of humanitarian travel 
documents, the Convention adds that states must give particularly "sympathetic consideration" to 
those who cannot obtain travel documents from their country of lawful residence.  104
     All voting states present at the Convention unanimously affirmed that both the issuance and 
recognition of travel documents was “necessary to facilitate the movement of refugees.”  Otto 105
Hieronymi (2003) suggests that the deep support and detailed stipulations of travel documents at 
the Convention shows that the framers understood the significance of movement as a basic 
human right that should be extended to refugees. It is unlikely coincidental that this thinking 
manifested itself not long after WW2, which served as a reminder that the right to leave and 
return is often denied by repressive regimes. According to Hieronymi, the post-war environment 
reminded the world that that "if French, English, or Swiss citizens have the right to travel outside 
their countries, so should the refugees who have been granted refugee status.”  106
     One hundred and forty-five states ratified the Convention, which took effect in 1954 and was 
amended (for the first and only time) in by the 1967 Protocol, which clarified wording from the 
1951 agreement to lessen time-specific and geographic restrictions to protection. For the first 
time in history, refugees enjoyed a uniform definition and clear covenants, recognized by 
international and legal bodies.  
104 Ibid, Art. 28. 
105 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 10. 
106 Hieronymi, 39. 
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     ​ ​The Convention’s ratification signified alignment and consensus, leading to the emergence of 
shared policy. The subsequent years exhibited deepening cooperation in Europe, ranging from 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created a common market, to the 1993 Treaty on European 
Union (the Maastricht Treaty), which formally established the EU.  This unity eventually 107
extended to visa policy, which operates through regional coordination with regulations that 
directly affect state capacity to administer travel documents. The subsequent section explores 
this system in detail.  
 
IV.II The Schengen Acquis and EU Visa Policy 
 
     ​The European Union operates with a common visa policy that controls exit and entry to 
European territory. This stems from the Schengen acquis, an assortment of laws which govern 
border control of certain member states. Another institutional innovation, this arrangement arose 
from the 1985 Schengen Agreement, which created the Schengen area of 26 members states that 
mutually abolished internal borders to promote free movement. The area accounts for all but 
eight of the European states, four of which (Cyprus, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria) are soon to 
join. Four non-EU nations (Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Switzerland) round out the list.  108
Signed in a Luxembourg town by the same name, and incorporated into EU framework in 1999, 
the Schengen acquis controls European entry and exit, and works in association with the EU 
Common Visa Code, which oversees the issuance of short-term visas in the EU, defined as no 
more than 90 days of a 180-day period.   109
107 ​“The History of the European Union." European Union. 
108 ​"Schengen Area - Visa Information for Schengen Countries." Schengen Visa Information.  
109 Hanke et al, 2, Jensen, 7.  
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      It is important to note that the acquis facilitates internal movement while working 
simultaneously to control and restrict external access. In other words, the aquis allows some to 
experience free movement while entirely restraining mobility for others. With the development 
of Schengen, visas now supplement existing passport requirements to screen potential threats 
prior to entry. As such, consular offices located in countries of departure provide an additional 
layer of security that allows free movement within Europe to proceed with national and public 
confidence. Put simply, visas serve for Schengen as “a border of paper.”  110
     The Schengen acquis and subsequent visa policy grew from a desire to secure borders, as 
states entered negotiations in the 1990s attuned to the disintegration of communist blocs and the 
imperative of prevention. As Finotelli and Sciortino (2013) write, the coordinated “introduction 
of a visa requirement was mainly targeted, at the time, at preventing the arrival on EU territory 
[of asylum seekers]...European governments were mostly interested in actions that could sharply 
curtail ex-ante the chances for a prospective applicant to enter a country where he or she could 
file an asylum claim.”  While much contemporary discussion of the Schengen area focuses on 111
intra-EU dynamics (particularly in the Brexit era), this suggests that the Schengen system and 
attempts to centralize policy concerned external dynamics as well, given the system’s implicit 
connection to border security and its tie to Hyndman and Mountz’s (2008) previously mentioned 
theories of externalization and securitization. 
     Such coordination of policy stemmed from the fact that with the exception of states bordering 
non-European territory or the sea, most member states required inter-territorial cooperation and a 
110 Simon Rampaer, “How the Framing Strategy of the European Institutions Influenced the Decision Not 
to Harmonise the Humanitarian Visa Scheme,” (2018), 10, 17. 
111 Finotelli and Sciortino, 83.  
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 mutual standardization to realize their domestic and security interests. The case of 1980s 
Germany exemplifies this imperative. The first Western European country to introduce visa 
requirements as a deterrence to asylum seekers, Germany struggled to gain control over the 
system without unity between the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany). After West Germany incorporated visa requirements, 
asylum seekers moved their stream to East Germany, managing still to reach West Germany via 
Berlin. Only when East German officials agreed to enact similarly restrictive policies in 1986 
was the flow “effectively contained.”  112
     It’s perhaps not surprising, then, that the German delegation played a particularly aggressive 
role at the first Schengen Agreement negotiations in 1985, arguing for an annex mandating that 
the abolition of internal border controls must come with 'compensatory measures' for internal 
security. In other words, the abolishment of internal borders was conditional on increased 
European cooperation and the restriction of ‘irregular’ migration.  As such, the very formation 113
of the current system grew from and not with concerns of forced migration and security. 
     In practice this translated into the formation of lists designating geographic grounds of 
exclusion and acceptance. Building from the visa regulations of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU in 
1995 established through the European Council a directory of countries whose citizens would 
require visas to enter EU territory, known as a negative list. This regulation (No. 2317/1995) 
evolved in 2001 into another regulation (No. 539/2001), expanding to encompass also a positive 
list that outlined states whose nationals would not require such documentation. These regulations 
112 ​Ibid​. 
113 Ibid, 84. 
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 accorded with the Schengen Agreement and, later, the European Visa Code, allowing widespread 
incorporation into the EU legal system.  114
     Regulation No. 539/2001 states that the delegation of countries to a negative or positive 
listing is governed by a “case-by-case assessment of a variety of criteria relating ​inter alia ​to 
illegal immigration, public policy and security, and to the European Union's external relations 
with third countries.”  Various amendments have since showed the importance of migration as 115
a criterion of consideration; Regulation No. 539/2001 was amended in 2003 and 2007 to exclude 
Ecuador and Bolivia, respectively, from the positive list. According to Finotelli and Sciortino, 
delegates explained these amendments by pointing to the high levels of migration out of those 
countries, while a French delegation in 2003 lobbied against lifting airport transit visa 
requirements for Sri Lankan citizens since Sri Lanka was “the second biggest source of asylum 
applications from Asia”   116
     The 2001 regulation bears relevance to this study because it dictates barriers to entry while 
neglecting to lower those barriers for refugees. The regulation  addresses “illegal immigration” 
as a consideration, but does not mention forced migration; since the ability to seek asylum is not 
illegal but rather a right recognized by the Convention, the hopeful refugee might argue that she 
or he falls outside the terms and is therefore exempt. However, in 2009 the European Parliament 
established a Community Code on Visas (also known as the Visa Code) through Regulation No. 
810/2009, aimed at “facilitating legitimate travel and tackling illegal immigration through further 
harmonisation of national legislation and handling practices at local consular missions.”  This 117
114 Ibid.  
115 ​Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001. 
116 ​Finotelli and Sciortino, 85. 
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 regulation clearly outlined compliance: in discussing visa eligibility for territorial entrance, the 
European Commission clarified that “the concept of third-country national...also includes 
refugees and stateless persons.”  118
     The importance of this last point must not be ignored: the system fails to make exceptions for 
refugees with regard to visa requirements and territorial access. Put simply, the visa structure 
affords no explicit protection to forced migrants in terms of movement. However, a close look at 
the Visa Code and Schengen frameworks suggest the possibility of legally administering 
humanitarian visas.  
 
IV.III The Legal Basis for Refugee Travel Documents 
 
     The legal basis for refugee travel documents comes from visa regulations. Two types of visas 
dictate entry into the EU: Schengen and national. Schengen visas provide for stays of up to three 
months, granted according to the Schengen acquis. The wider European Union regulates 
long-term entrance with national visas, which authorize residence for longer than three months 
and accord to state-specific law.  Both types engage with the common European Visa Code, 119
which is significant since its framework allows for the possibility of travel documents on 
humanitarian grounds.  
     Most pertinent to this discussion are Articles 19 and 25 of the Visa Code. The former 
regulates terms of admissibility for Schengen visas, and the latter addresses visas of limited 
territorial validity (LTV), which are travel documents valid in at least one but not all Schengen 
states. Article 19 outlines consulate duties, procedures of admission, and application components 
118 Moreno Lax, 325. 
119 Jensen, 15. 
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 (valid travel document, photograph, fee paid, application signed, biometric data collected, 
completed on time) prior to addressing derogation in section 4: “By way of derogation, an 
application that does not meet the requirements set out in paragraph 1 ​may be considered 
admissible on humanitarian grounds ​or for reasons of national interest” (emphasis added).  120
     This provision recognizes that the standard components of a visa application are meant for 
regular migrants, not for forced migrants pushed quickly and perhaps violently from their homes. 
The system expects applicants to produce valid travel documents, information about their 
journey and stay, proof of return, and evidence of economic subsistence. Rare is the refugee who 
can meet these requirements.  ​Article 19 accounts for this unfortunate truth by derogating from 121
admissibility provisions, meaning that it selectively allows the consideration of applications that 
lack the requisite materials.  
     Article 25 acts similarly, allowing derogation from Schengen provisions. Article 25 compels 
member states to issue Schengen LTV visas “exceptionally” when “the Member State ​considers 
it necessary on humanitarian grounds​, ​for reasons of national interest or because of 
international obligations​” to derogate from Schengen Borders Code regulation in which the 
applicant may not otherwise qualify (emphasis added).  In other words, there exist two legal 122
mechanisms of recourse for humanitarian visas, deemed allowable even after failing to meet 
other standards.  
     In sum, several legal and transnational frameworks exist to provide for the protection and 
mobility of refugees and asylum seekers across borders, and allow for the possibility of 
120 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009. 
121 Moreno Lax, 326.  
122 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006; Regulation (EC) No 810/2009. 
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 facilitated movement. The 1951 Convention enumerated rights and mechanisms of mobility, 
while the Schengen acquis and Common Visa Code securitized European borders, to the 
detriment of refugees. However, provisions exist within legal structures that open the possibility 
of humanitarian visa issuance, ambiguities and inconsistencies allowing for state-specific 
interpretation. Taken together, these institutions support the legal issuance of visas on a 
humanitarian basis.  
     Ambiguity in the Visa Code complicates this support. While articles 19 and 25 allow for the 
possibility of such humanitarian visas, they do so in clouded and sometimes contradictory 
language. Article 19, for example, outlines eligibility and admissibility for Schengen visas yet 
fails to cite international obligation as a means of derogation, making the provision seemingly 
incompatible with Article 25, which states that humanitarian visas shall be administered “on 
humanitarian grounds, for reasons of national interest ​or because of international obligations 
[emphasis added].”  The Code further exacerbates tension between these provisions by using 123
differing directives in each (“shall” in Article 25, and “may” in Article 19), and never outlining 
the procedure for lodging LTV visa applications on humanitarian grounds. Of concern to the 
universal principle of non-refoulement, the Code leaves unclear whether or not a failed applicant 
may appeal their case, inviting uncomfortable questions about decision-making and due process. 
And perhaps most perplexingly, EU law at no point provides a definition of “humanitarian 
grounds,” meaning that the entire framework upon which this rests is discretionary, speculative 
even.  124
123 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009. 
124 Rampaer, 34. 
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      The lack of an institutionalized framework clear in phrasing and intent presents a plethora of 
problems, making subjective what is meant to be objective: the law. As expressed by Alexander 
Betts (2010), these tensions and ambiguities mean that “countries of destination and transit 
currently lack guidance in how to interpret and fulfil their human rights obligations towards 
vulnerable migrants.”  To illustrate this lack of guidance, and the heavy hand of interpretation, 125
this thesis turns to the case of a Syrian family hoping to escape to Belgium.  126
 
IV.IV Ambiguity and Interpretation: ​X and X v État belge 
 
     On October 12, 2016, a family of five (two adults and three children) applied for a 90-day 
LTV visa through the Belgian embassy in Lebanon, lodged on humanitarian grounds with the 
intention of later applying for asylum. From Aleppo, Syria, the applicants claimed that the 
political and wartime situation made their family targets of attack, given their Orthodox Christian 
religion. To substantiate their claims, one applicant detailed the family’s experience of being 
abducted by “an armed group” and tortured, only released upon payment of ransom. The 
applicants noted that because of the war, the border between Lebanon and Syria was closed, and 
that as a result they could not escape to neighboring countries to register as refugees.  127
     On October 18, the Office des étrangers (Belgian Aliens’ Office’) refused the Syrian family’s 
visa applications, arguing that since they intended to subsequently apply for asylum, their intent 
was not actually to stay in Belgium for a 90-day period. The Office added that “Member States 
125 Betts (2010), 11. 
126 ​While not a formal case study of the thesis, this example is worth laying out in detail because of its 
recent occurrence, prominence in the literature and news, and the clarity with which it displays the impact 
of ambiguity. 
127 Court of Justice of the European Union. "Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-638/16 PPU X and X 
v État Belge. 
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 are not obliged to admit into their territory all persons finding themselves in a catastrophic 
situation.”  In desperation, the family approached the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers 128
(Belgian Asylum and Immigration Board) with the hope of recourse, asking for a suspension of 
the application decision. Given the urgency of the deteriorating situation in Syria, the Board 
recommended the case, called ​X and X v État belge,​ to Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), the high judicial body tasked with “ensuring EU law is interpreted and applied the same 
in every EU country; ensuring countries and EU institutions abide by EU law.”  Prior to 129
judging the case, the Court requested a preliminary ruling (which, in the CJEU, serves as a 
non-binding recommendation) from its Advocate General and senior legal advisor, Paolo 
Mengozzi. 
     Advocate General Mengozzi delivered his ruling on February 7, 2017. The 31-page opinion 
began by recognizing the discretionary nature of the case, writing in the very first line that the 
request for a preliminary ruling “concerns ​the interpretation of​ Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation 
(EC) No 810/2009 of the Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a 
Community Code on Visas (‘the Visa Code’)” (emphasis added).  The Advocate General 130
additionally noted that other EU regulations, mainly Articles 4 and 18 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (which prohibit torture and enumerate the right to 
asylum, respectively) also merited interpretive consideration.  131
128 Ibid. 
129"Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) - European Union - European Commission." European 
Union.  
130 Court of Justice of the European Union. "Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-638/16 PPU X and X 
v État Belge. 
131 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Articles 4 and 18.  
50 
      By beginning his opinion with an immediate recognition of the Visa Code’s ambiguity, the 
leading advisor to one of Europe’s highest courts framed his legal analysis in discretionary 
terms, ultimately grounding his ruling on the basis of interpretation. Ruling in the Syrian 
family’s favor, Mengozzi wrote that there is no need to find a legal route to Europe since: 
That legal route already exists, namely that of Article 25(1)(a) of the Visa Code, as the 
rapporteur of the committee on civil liberties, justice and home affairs of the Parliament 
has indeed acknowledged. For the reasons which will be set out in my analysis below, I 
invite the Court to find the existence of such a legal route which entails the obligation to 
issue humanitarian visas, under Article 25(1)(a) of the Visa Code, under certain 
conditions.  132
 
     In reaching this conclusion, the Advocate General considered a patchwork of European 
legislation to conclude that the Visa Code “as a minimum, [requires] a Member State to examine 
the humanitarian grounds” of LTV visa applications, and that if claims are well-founded, “the 
Visa Code requires that it issue that national a visa with limited territorial validity.”  133
Recognizing again the Code’s ambiguity, Mengozzi noted that while the wording implies 
state-specific discretion, EU law that failed to recognize religious persecution as legitimate 
would render the term ‘humanitarian grounds’ meaningless. After adding considerations of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and its protection from torture, he thus concluded that discretion 
in the Code “is necessarily circumscribed by EU law.”  134
     In writing this opinion, the Advocate General assessed the interplay of various regulations to 
consider legal ambiguity, drawing not only from the Visa Code but also the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. In doing so, he interpreted EU law as having connections and ties, and as a 
132 ​ ​Court of Justice of the European Union. "Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-638/16 PPU X and X 
v État Belge," 2.  
133 Ibid, 20. 
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 result, found a “positive obligation on the part of the Member States” to issue travel documents 
when the refusal to do so would result in subjugation to torture or inhumane treatment. As such, 
the ruling, mostly legal in nature, did not lack moral appeal.  The Advocate General opined: “It 135
is, in my view, crucial that, at a time when borders are closing and walls are being built, the 
Member States do not escape their responsibilities, as they follow from EU law or, if you will 
allow me the expression, their EU law and our EU law.”  136
     By invoking the question of hard borders, walls, and and shared responsibility (“our EU 
law”), the Advocate General expressed ethical concerns, appealing to liberal European values as 
well as the law. This seemingly peripheral detail bears note; a high advisor to the European 
Court recognized in writing not only the legal right of refugees to access territory, but also the 
humanitarian and moral imperative for the Union to respect that right. The following excerpt 
displays Mengozzi’s framing of the issue as both a legal and an ethical crisis: 
Frankly, what alternatives did the applicants in the main proceedings have? Stay in Syria? 
Out of the question. Put themselves at the mercy of unscrupulous smugglers, risking their  
lives in doing so, in order to attempt to reach Italy or Greece? Intolerable. Resign  
themselves to becoming illegal refugees in Lebanon, with no prospect of international  
protection, even running the risk of being returned to Syria? Unacceptable.  137
 
     The explanation of this specific case and the Advocate General’s opinion benefits the present 
study by showing not only the process of interpretation but also the discordant results. Exactly 
one month after Mengozzi delivered his ruling, the Court released its official judgement, directly 
dissenting from the findings of its top advisor. The Court assessed that short-term visas filed with 
135 ​Differing from the ‘juridical’ ethos exhibited during the Nansen era.  
136 Court of Justice of the European Union. "Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-638/16 PPU X and X 
v État Belge, 2. 
137 Ibid, 27. 
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 intent of extension do not actually qualify as short-term, and therefore fall outside the framework 
analyzed by Mengozzi. Hinging the entire opinion on this belief, the Court swiftly concluded that 
an application made “on the basis of Article 25” with the intent of staying longer than 90-days 
“does not fall within the scope of that [the Visa] code but, as European Union law currently 
stands, solely within that of national law.”  138
     The opposing rulings show different approaches utilized within the same legal apparatus. The 
Advocate General looked at the relationship between existing regulation to override ambiguity 
with a methodological, legal, and at times, moral approach. The Court of Justice, in contrast, 
focused on a technicality, allowing intent to sideline any other discussion of legality. By doing 
so, the Court essentially delivered an institutional blessing of discrepancy, not eliminating 
humanitarian visa issuance but leaving it to the politics of individual states.  
     ​X and X v État belge​ provides a compelling and complicated scenario of mobility, and the 
possibility of mitigated success in the face of failure. With regard to the present study, this case 
displays the practical constraints of existing regulation while also suggesting that even with 
ambiguities inherent in the law, there still can exist successful mobility. Crucially, the 
Syrian-Belgian case suggests that when it comes to refugee mobility, one condition for success is 
the positive interpretation of existing frameworks, as applied by the Advocate General. Other 
potential conditions seem to be the interplay and joint-consideration of various EU-wide 
regulations, as well as a consideration of moral duty and ethics.  
     Taken together, the previous sections illustrate not only that protection frameworks have 
evolved since the Nansen era, but also that legal and institutional mechanisms of mobility do 
138 X and X v. État belge, C‑638/16 PPU, European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union.  
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 exist, even if shrouded in ambiguity. The existing framework for humanitarian visa issuance is 
fragmentary, incomplete in its conception and execution. It is also incomplete in its 
harmonization, and in the final portion of this chapter on legal and institutional growth, this 
thesis considers disputes of coordination as they relate to travel document issuance.  
 
IV.V  Challenges to Harmonization: A Supranational Dispute 
  
     As legal and institutional frameworks have evolved, so too has the discourse around them. 
This section traces European disputes about whether or not to coordinate mechanisms of 
facilitated entry for refugees, finding pockets of support overwhelmed by a desire for state 
discretion. 
    Since the creation of Schengen, governing bodies have met frequently to assess the desirability 
and feasibility of harmonized entry procedures with regard to humanitarian territorial access. In 
2001 the European Commission administered a study on Protected Entry Procedures (PEPs), 
legal channels of migration that extend the asylum process to foreign land, often by engaging the 
process in countries of origin. The study found that PEPs, which include humanitarian visa 
schemes,  could be fairly used as “a complement to the existing territorial asylum system,” 139
prompting further discussion about implementation.  140
    In 2003, the Italian president convened Member States and institutional bodies to assess 
options for increased coordination. The European Parliament expressed support, but Member 
States did not, opting instead for state-specific autonomy. As articulated by The Migration 
Institute of Finland's Outi Lepola, the idea was “found too radical and did not get political 
139 As well as formal resettlement and temporary admission.  
140 Jensen, 29. 
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 support.” ​ The Commission therefore decided against creating “a uniform law text on PEPs,” 141
deferring instead to the status quo.   142
     In 2008, European bodies creating the Common Code on Visas, standardizing policy 
governing short-term stay in the Schengen area. In the process, various institutions voiced 
support for the institutionalization of PEPs, with the Commission even mentioning humanitarian 
visas explicitly:  
Procedures for protected entry and the issuing of humanitarian visas should be facilitated,  
including calling on the aid of diplomatic representations or any other structure set up  
within the framework of a global mobility management strategy.  143
 
     As it had in 2003, Parliament signaled support again, compelling the Council to give “due 
consideration” to the use of mechanisms like humanitarian visas. The Council expressed accord, 
yet added considerations of restriction by speaking of “the necessary strengthening of European 
border controls.” Even still, it noted that this necessity “should not prevent access to protection 
systems by those people entitled to benefit under them,” suggesting the continuation of both 
humanitarian and security frames within institutional discourse.   144
     In December 2009, the European Council adopted the Stockholm Programme, a five-year 
framework of action regarding security, citizenship, asylum, and visa policy in Europe. It 
ignored calls from European institutions to build a framework for PEPs, and humanitarian visas 
in particular, centering instead on resettlement programs and policies of first asylum. And while 
Stockholm did call for "new approaches concerning access to asylum procedures," it 
141 Jensen, 32. 
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 simultaneously stipulated that Member States should participate in them "on a voluntary basis," 
thus removing any measure of coordinated legal accountability.  145
     By rejecting the Parliament and Commission’s desires to coordinate PEP schemes and 
institutionalize humanitarian visa issuance, the Council gave a green-light for state discretion, 
one also supported by the aforementioned legal ambiguity. At the same time, it left the door open 
for the potential of facilitated movement, a fact not unnoticed by the Parliament. In its April 
2014 review of the Stockholm Programme, the Parliament called on states to interpret the Visa 
Code intentionally, “mak[ing] use of the current provisions of the Visa Code and the Schengen 
Borders Code ​allowing the issuing of humanitarian visas​” (emphasis added). 
     This dynamic of supranational support and “interinstitutional dispute” continued for years.  146
When negotiations advanced in 2014 on the European Visa Code and reforms, the Parliament’s 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) endorsed the inclusion of formal 
humanitarian visa frameworks, but “both [the] Commission and Council opposed the inclusion 
of provisions on humanitarian visas in the Visa Code, with the Council refusing to continue 
negotiations if these amendments were not withdrawn.”   147
     European bodies eventually managed to amendment European visa policy, but they never 
formalized legal avenues through a coordinated and institutionalized approach to humanitarian 
visas. At the time of this writing, there still lacks an unified, institutionalized approach to 
humanitarian visas. However, in October 2018 the Parliament formally advanced a proposal for 
the institutionalization of humanitarian visas, at the end of a year that saw over 2,000 deaths at 
145 Ibid, 34.  
146 Rampaer, 39. 
147 Humanitarian visas European Added Value Assessment accompanying the European Parliament's 
legislative own initiative report, 10.  
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 sea.  It is not immediately apparent whether this appeal will resonate with European 148
institutions, who have seesawed between support and dissent across time. In the interim, 
Parliament has asked the European Council to advance legislation formally harmonising 
protected entry by March 31, 2019.  The Council has not not, as of yet, formally communicated 149
its intent.  
     As cited in the Parliamentary proposal, 90% of those granted international protection in 2018 
reached European territory through irregular means.  This statistic, though sobering when 150
considered alongside the perils of irregular entry, suggests that at least some legal avenues 
functionally exist, regardless of deadlock and negative discourse concerning entry. Even without 
trans-European coordination, there do exist examples of humanitarian visa issuance, though rare 
and small in scale. The following chapter analyses the most prominent example of humanitarian 
visa issuance in contemporary Europe: Italy’s Humanitarian Corridors initiative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
148 Claire Higgins, "How a Visa for Asylum Seekers Could Grant Safe Passage to Europe,” (2019). 
149 ​Ibid. 
150 ​ ​Wouter Van Ballegooij and Cecilia Navarra. "Humanitarian Visas: European Added Value 
Assessment accompanying the European Parliament's Legislative own-initiative report” (2018). 
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 Section V. Humanitarian Corridors (Case study II)  
     This chapter assesses the Humanitarian Corridors initiative, a program started in Italy to 
administer visas to vulnerable refugees. It begins with an in-depth analysis of the initiative, 
focused on program structure, logistics, and relevant actors. It then considers the conditions of 
success that allowed for facilitated mobility, before addressing the potential for replication.  
 
V.II Italy and The Humanitarian Corridors Initiative  
     On May 13, 2015, the European Commission implored Member States to make full use of 
existing legal avenues to facilitate asylum, “including private/non-governmental sponsorships 
and humanitarian permits.”  In response, Italy opened Humanitarian Corridors, a 151
state-sanctioned scheme to facilitate access to Italian territory through the provision of visas. The 
initiative extended LTV visas over a two-year period to refugees from Syria and Iraq residing in 
Lebanon, facilitating travel by plane and overseeing integration.  
     It is misleading to present the driver of this program as Italy alone, or even Italy at all. Not 
entirely a governmental scheme, Humanitarian Corridors is largely an ecumenical initiative, one 
organized and overseen by faith-based organizations. Three religious associations, the 
Community of Sant'Egidio (of Catholic denomination), the federation of the Evangelical 
Churches, and the Waldensian Churches (of Evangelical and Methodist denominations), together 
proposed the arrangement, and in December 2015 entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the Italian Home Office and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
151 European Commission. “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, The 
Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European 
Agenda on Migration.” 
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 Cooperation. The MoU, which is not legally binding, outlined the initiative and established 
procedures of operation, such as funding, screening, and responsibility. Within 24 months of 
implementation, 1,000 people had been granted legal access to Italian territory.   152
     The program finds its legal footing in Article 25 of the Visa Code, which, as previously 
discussed, allows Member States to issue visas on humanitarian grounds due to national interest 
or international obligations. Given that European institutions have failed to change relevant legal 
frameworks in dynamic response to need, the Humanitarian Corridors initiative presents, as 
explained in a policy briefing from the University of Sussex, “practical ways to work within the 
existing legal and political frameworks and to fill the gaps within them.”  In this way, 153
Humanitarian Corridors exist as ‘soft law,’ much like the approaches previously advocated by 
Alexander Betts (2010).  
     This is not the first time that states have enabled humanitarian visa issuance without 
supranational institutionalization, as evidenced by the Nansen coalition. But though theoretically 
similar to other humanitarian visa schemes, the Humanitarian Corridors approach is entirely 
unique; although it also works within existing frameworks, it targets applicants not only by 
geography but by vulnerability, and strictly delegates responsibility between church and state.  
     To facilitate mobility, the aforementioned religious organizations (henceforth referred to as 
faith-based organizations, or FBOs)  proposed a capacities-based division of labor between 154
themselves and state actors, codified by the MoU. The state oversees advanced screening of 
152 Gois and Falchi, 66. 
153 Collyer, Michael, Maria Mancinelli, and Fabio Petito. “Humanitarian Corridors: Safe and Legal 
Pathways to Europe.” 
154 This thesis refers to all religious actors in the humanitarian sphere as FBOs, recognizing that some 
small and local actors such as individual houses of worship or groups may view themselves more as local 
communities rather than entire organizations.  
59 
 applicants and the practical administration of visas, while the FBOs do almost everything else. 
They identify candidates, perform security checks, liaise between embassies and Italian 
ministries, coordinate travel, and lead integrative support such as Italian language classes and 
cultural immersion seminars. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, FBOs foot the bill. As 
explained by Michael Collyer, Maria Mancinelli, and Fabio Petito (2017), “The Italian state 
bears no financial responsibility.”  155
     An exact breakdown of the process from start to finish displays the symbiosis of relevant 
actors as well as the disproportionate burden that falls on civil society. The process begins with 
FBOs working with UNHCR to isolate potential applicants, facilitated by staff members on the 
ground in Lebanon working with local non-profits and trained to find vulnerable individuals 
most in need of protection. Potential applicants are categorized into the UNHCR’s resettlement 
categories  before FBO workers conduct interviews to assess the level of priority (emergency, 156
urgent, or normal). The Italian government then becomes involved for the first time in the 
process, conducting screening at overseas embassies (the local government also screens 
applicants). After extensive screening, the Italian consular in each country receives a list of 
“potential beneficiaries,” to be screened by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. Continuing the 
governmental involvement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation takes 
the necessary steps to allow the issuance of visas, and the Italian consulate administers “visas 
with limited territorial validity in accordance with Article 25 of the Visa Regulation.”  157
155 ​Michael Collyer, Maria Mancinelli, and Fabio Petito. “Humanitarian Corridors: Safe and Legal 
Pathways to Europe,” (2017). 
156 "Legal and/or Physical Protection Needs, Survivors of Torture and/or Violence, Medical Needs, 
Women and Girls at Risk, Family Reunification, Children and Adolescents at Risk and Lack of 
Foreseeable Alternative Durable Solutions,” as provided by the Collyer, Mancinelli, and Petito (2017).  
157 ​Michael Collyer, Maria Mancinelli, and Fabio Petito. “Humanitarian Corridors: Safe and Legal 
Pathways to Europe,” (2017). 
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      FBOs re-enter the picture at this stage, taking control of the process. In countries of origin, 
they lead “awareness sessions” to orient each refugee to Italian society before they fly on a 
“specially designated Alitalia flight” to Rome’s Fiumicino airport, where FBO volunteers await 
with welcoming signs, tea, and food. As explained by Claire Higgins (2017), FBOs even bring 
toys for the children, so that they are “able to play while their parents lodge all the paperwork,” 
assisted by volunteers who walk beneficiaries through the asylum application.  158
     FBOs then place each refugee in an Italian community, housed by patrons, and begin 
integrative support by teaching Italian language classes and providing employment-based 
assistance. Community police departments oversee the processing of asylum applications, and 
once beneficiaries are granted status, Italy’s Territorial Commission (which oversees requests for 
protection) allows local police to issue “permits of stay” that last for five years and can be 
indefinitely renewed.  
     Each refugee receives a decision within six months of arrival, which Higgins (2017) says 
contrasts with a two year average that awaits refugees who enter through other channels. “De 
facto their request for international protection is accelerated, as authorities know they come with 
HC [Humanitarian Corridors] and that they have already been screened.”   159
     This system clearly provides administrative and cultural support, and it also enables 
preliminary financial stability. As refugees learn about Italy and seek employment, FBOs issue 
prepaid bank cards for a 12-month period, and require holders to attend monthly meetings with 
support networks. As such, Humanitarian Corridors provide not only legal access to territory but 
158 Higgins, Claire. "How Do Italy's Orderly Humanitarian Corridors Work?" (2017). 
159 ​Ibid​. 
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 also integrative and social success, which is vital for long-term success but is often ignored in 
discussions of mobility.  160
   Altogether, the process of opening and operating Humanitarian Corridors exhibits a novel 
approach to protection, one defined by the joint efforts of civil society (mainly faith-based) and 
state actors. It also displays a scheme driven ostensibly by humanitarian concern; FBOs fund the 
initiative through patron donations and by opening their homes, implying at least some level of 
humanitarian impetus. But placed against the backdrop of failed coordination and narratives of 
securitization and externalization of asylum, the achievements of the Humanitarian Corridors 
initiative seem surprising, their momentum and consensus anomalous. The following section 
analyzes conditions that allowed for the success of Humanitarian Corridors.  
 
V.III Italian Humanitarian Corridors: Conditions for Success 
     In the interest of transparency, this section begins by recognizing the dearth of state, 
institutional, and scholarly data about the Humanitarian Corridors initiative. Existing information 
comes almost exclusively from sparse and non-substantive newspaper reports, as well as 
statements published by the FBOs themselves, which tend to include numbers and dates but little 
to no information about negotiations (which were largely behind closed-doors), cross-country 
communication, or institutional discourse. It is additionally difficult to analyze this program 
given its recent implementation and the fact that as of this writing, no formal evaluation has been 
administered to measure its execution or impact. 
160 Ibid. 
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      This section will accordingly proceed by assessing what little is known about the conditions 
of this initiative, in an effort to tease out tentative hypotheses that can be used as a foundation for 
future research, conducted when more information is available. Rather than attempt to draw 
broad conclusions--without sufficient evidence--this thesis will consider domestic determinants 
and potential conditions, relying upon news coverage, political statements, framing devices, and 
interviews.  
     When assessing the Humanitarian Corridors initiative, religion presents a logical place to 
start. The entire scheme, after all, relies on the cooperation and resources of FBOs. A robust 
body of literature explores engagement of religious communities in the humanitarian sphere, 
with scholars detailing a rich history of resource provision. Jessica Eby, Erika Iverson, Jenifer 
Smyers, and Erol Kekic (2011) analyze integrative support to call FBOs “instrumental” in 
resettling refugees in the United States,  while Stephanie Nawyn (2005) holds that FBOs use 161
capital to help refugees “adapt culturally as well as financially.”  Various studies find a deep 162 163
involvement of FBOs in refugee resettlement and aid across the globe, particularly in terms of 
cultural education, financial support, housing, and employment aid.  
     Academics focus also on the intangible resources afforded by FBOs, most notably advocacy 
and political persuasion. Eby et. al. (2011) suggest that religious communities have long 
exercised these powers, writing that “before the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees 
and long before the US ratified the 1967 Protocol, churches and synagogues in the US were 
161 Jessica Eby,, Erika Iverson, Jenifer Smyers, and Erol Kekic. "The Faith Community’s Role in Refugee 
Resettlement in the United States,” (2011), 586.  
162 Stephanie Nawyn. “Faithfully Providing Refuge: The Role of Religious Organizations in Refugee 
Assistance and Advocacy,” (2005), 31.  
163 See Orji (2011), Wilson (2011), Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2011).  
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 responding to refugee needs and advocating for policies to protect refugee rights.”  Michele 164
Margolis (2018) also writes of religious organizations as activist actors, discussing the 
Evangelical Immigration Table, a coalition of Christian evangelical leaders who support liberal 
immigration policies, and their successful attempts “at demobilizing evangelical opponents of 
immigration reform.”   165
     The scholarship suggests that FBOs are separate but not entirely isolated from political or 
governmental organizations, and that they possess a potent ability to provide protection, lobby 
administrative bodies, and even sway opinion. They are, in essence, global actors that “share 
many characteristics with their secular counterparts and are influenced by the same political, 
social and economic contexts.”  With these considerations in mind, this thesis now considers 166
how the specific FBOs involved in the Humanitarian Corridors initiative leveraged their 
positions and resources to successfully negotiate with state governments and facilitate mobility.  
     Negotiations began after Italian FBOs  announced a proposal in April 2015, launched in 167
advance of an ecumenical leadership conference in Bari called “Christians in the Middle East - 
What Future?” According to press releases by the Community of Sant'Egidio  the impetus for 168
the proposal was the increase of deaths in the Mediterranean, with a particular focus on “the last 
tragedy off Libya,” referring to the April 2015 incident in which 850 drowned near the coast of 
164 Jessica Eby, Erika Iverson, Jenifer Smyers, and Erol Kekic. "The Faith Community’s Role in Refugee 
Resettlement in the United States,” (2011), 589. 
165 Michele Margolis, "How Far Does Social Group Influence Reach? Identities, Elites, and Immigration 
Attitudes," (2018). 
166 Elizabeth Ferris. "Faith-based and Secular Humanitarian Organizations" (2005). 
167 The Community of Sant'Egidio, the federation of the Evangelical Churches, and the Waldensian 
Churches. 
168 These releases were written in Italian. The author of this thesis does not speak or read Italian, so 
quoted material has been translated using computer software, and may therefore not be entirely precise.  
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 Libya.  Paolo Naso of the ​Federation of Evangelical Churches in Italy (FCEI) traces the 169
motivation even earlier, stating that “it was the disaster of Lampedusa on October 3, 2013 that 
opened our eyes – although this was unfortunately not the last catastrophe in the Mediterranean 
Sea...we are very conscious of the fact that we have to do something!”  170
     The Sant'Egidio communication and Naso’s remarks suggest the Humanitarian Corridors 
grew primarily as an immediate reaction to recent events, bolstered by geographic proximity to 
the Central Mediterranean Route. These motivations feature prominently in the initiative’s 
framework; while a specific proposal was not made public, ​  the objectives of the scheme were, 171
and their framing supports this theory: 
1. To avoid journeys on the boats in the Mediterranean, which have already caused a high 
number of deaths, including many children;  
2. To avoid human trafficking, preventing the exploitation of human traffickers who do 
business with those who flee from wars;  
3. To grant people in "vulnerable conditions" (victims of persecution, torture and violence, 
as well as families with children, elderly people, sick people, persons with disabilities) 
legal entry on Italian territory with humanitarian visa, with the possibility to apply  for 172
asylum.  173
 
     Together with the Sant'Egidio press release and a timeline tied to the Libyan tragedy, these 
objectives suggest that that initiative was motivated, at least in part, by concerns of human rights 
and dignity. The focus on “vulnerable” individuals as well as avoiding Mediterranean drownings 
169 Anthony Faiola. "U.N. Estimates up to 850 Migrants Perished in Capsized Boat off Libya" (2015). 
170 Benoit Lannoo. "Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Urges Colleagues to Copy Initiative of 'Humanitarian 
Corridors' – The Guest Blog" (2016). 
171 ​In the absence of a public proposal, the Community of Sant’Egidio released a brief description of 
Humanitarian Corridors, characterized as “linked to European consulates, to which asylum seekers can be 
contacted to obtain a visa that allows them to safely tackle the journey to safety.” 
172 ​Note that unlike the ECRE, which ruled against LTV visa issuance to individuals intending on 
applying for asylum, the Humanitarian Corridors initiative explicitly condones that intent, leaving open 
the “possibility” to apply.  
173 Comunità Di Sant'Egidio. "Humanitarian Corridors for Refugees." (2018). 
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 and human exploitation frames the initiative in humanitarian terms, rather than purely legal 
terms.  In this way, the initiative is inherently distinct with regard to inception and impetus from 
the Nansen scheme, which, as previously mentioned, centered on geopolitics, world order, and 
legal status. The Humanitarian Corridors program differs in that it contains elements of legal 
considerations and works within existing frameworks, but grew from actors whose primary 
concerns were not themselves legal.  
     At the 2015 Bari summit, various religious leaders (including those involved and uninvolved 
in the initiative) addressed the need for collective action, as well as a divine duty. Bishop 
Angaelos of the Coptic Orthodox Church, for example, spoke of “standing for a common cause 
of humanity,” and articulated the unique position of the religious community in perilous times: 
 
Not everyone in the world is as well-meaning as people around this table. There are 
opportunists, there are political opportunists who if we do not claim this issue, they will  
claim it and they will speak to it for their own purposes, and they will not benefit our  
brothers and our sisters who are very much in need.  174
 
     Bishop Angaelos’ comments imply the call to action is grounded in religious obligation. In 
this way, his words mirror what Eby et. al. (2011) express when they state that often FBOs 
demand and mobilize action “not because they had a formal mandate to do so, but because they 
felt a moral obligation to respond to human suffering.”  Luca Maria Negro, President of the 175
FCEI, invoked similar appeals in expressing his satisfaction with the project, arguing: ​“it cannot 
174 Anba Angaelos. "Christians in the Middle East - What Future? - HG Bishop Angaelos, Italy," (2015). 
175  Jessica Eby, Erika Iverson, Jenifer Smyers, and Erol Kekic. "The Faith Community’s Role in Refugee 
Resettlement in the United States,” (2011), 589. 
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 be that in Italy today there is still no space for a woman who needs to give birth,  just like Jesus’ 
mother at Christmas.”   176
      Statements by relevant stakeholders as well as the history of faith-based advocacy support a 
firm conception of why  FBOs initiated the Humanitarian Corridors, which, for the purposes of 
this study, bears great importance. Faith and care for humanity as motivators of humanitarian 
action are conditions for success, and necessary ones at that; this specific initiative could not 
possibly have existed without the buy in of FBOs.  
     However, these conditions only explain half of the puzzle--why did the Italian government 
agree? Some argue that the government agreed simply because the program comes at no 
financial cost to the state. Alessia Melillo, who works for a branch of the Federation of Protestant 
Churches in Italy (FCEI) called Mediterranean Hope, spoke to this consideration in an interview 
conducted for this thesis. Melillo has worked for Mediterranean Hope for ten years, and now 
specializes on Humanitarian Corridor initiative.  Melillo believes that FBOs persuaded the 177
government largely by focusing on arrangements of cost and responsibility.  
We got the Italian government to agree because there are no expenses for them. They  
have no expenses and don’t have to think about anything because the reception system is  
up to us-- we provide the travel, the tickets for the plane to come to Italy, and we provide 
the bucket money to beneficiaries and we provide the accommodation. So the state --we 
needed the state to get permission to start the project-- but the state doesn’t have to take  
care of the program at all...as soon as they get on the plane, the responsibility is all up to 
 us.  178
 
176 ​"Sant'Egidio: Humanitarian Corridors Open for One Thousand People" (2015). 
177 ​Alessia Melillo did not disclose whether or not she herself was present during the negotiations, but she 
spoke of meetings with government officials fluently, in detail, and using pronouns that suggested her 
attendance, implying that either she was present as an active member of the negotiations, or that as a 
long-standing employee of the FCEI, she is privileged with information about the negotiations that is not 
otherwise public. This adds credibility to her statements.  
178 ​Alessia Melillo, phone interview by author. February 14, 2019. 
67 
      Melillo’s statements suggest that one condition of success for the Italian initiative is its 
funding scheme, which was built to relieve burden and pressure from the state. Given the near 
totality of a hands-off approach afforded to the government by this arrangement, this hypothesis 
seems likely. However, it falls short of supporting a solid conclusion of why the government 
actually acted on the proposal; the state was not legally bound to do anything, and could simply 
have elected to do nothing, which would also have presented no financial burden.  
     Relying on statements made by Italian officials, framing devices, and select interviews, this 
thesis now builds upon the lack of state burden to advance a tentative hypothesis concerning  
vulnerability, Italian gain, and state prominence.  
      On June 10, 2016, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
published an official description  of the Humanitarian Corridors initiative online.  The 179 180
webpage is short, less than 500 words total, and it frames the program in two different ways: in 
terms of reducing the threat or danger associated with refugees, and in terms of the benefit to 
Italy. The first framing comes from discussions of vulnerability and security. In discussing the 
program, the Ministry clarifies that the Corridor is only for people in “particularly vulnerable 
conditions,” a category it defines as including victims of human trafficking, single women with 
children, the elderly, disabled individuals, and people with severe illnesses.  To further assuage 181
concerns of safety, the Ministry writes that the scheme is a “way of also meeting our need of 
security,” given the stringent and multi-layer screening involved in the process. As such, the 
179 This description exists as one of the only accessible state-published explanations of the scheme. 
180 By the date of publication, refugees had already begun arriving and beginning the process of 
resettlement and integration. 
181 This phrasing closely resembles the wording employed by Sant’Egidio on its website: “Single women 
with children, victims of human trafficking, the elderly, and the disabled.” 
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 Ministry presents to the Italian people an image of refugees far removed from that propagated by 
right-wing movements and anti-immigrant groups: innocent, safe, and rigorously screened 
humans, desperately in need of help.  182
     The Ministry frames Humanitarian Corridors not only as helping others, but also as helping 
Italy. It does so by outlining the scheme’s funding as well as its potential replicability. After 
explaining the exact breakdown of funds (0.8% income from members of the Waldensian 
Church, 0.5% of income tax payments from members of the Community of Sant’Egidio, and 
private donations) to illustrate no financial burden on the state, the Ministry encourages 
replication and expresses that Humanitarian Corridors can bestow honor upon Italy. “[It] is a 
model of solidarity that is a source of pride for Italy, as also Pope Francis said: “it is the drop that 
will change the sea.’”  183
     A clear focus on vulnerability and Italian gain emerges from these framings, one that is 184
mirrored in public statements of Italian officials. Former Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni, who 
served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the program’s inception, spoke and tweeted 
often with parallel sentiment. In September 2016, he addressed the UN Summit on Refugees and 
Migrants to laud “the great humanity of the Italian people in receiving those who land every day 
on our shores,” and highlighted that beneficiaries were the “most vulnerable among migrants. I 
am thinking particularly of women and unaccompanied children.”   185
182 Humanitarian Corridors." Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (2016). 
183 ​Ibid​.  
184 ​The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is the main body of the Italian 
government that oversees this program, and as such, its framing lends insight into what it prioritizes and 
views as beneficial aspects of the initiative. 
185 Paolo Gentiloni. "Statement Delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation of Italy, Hon. Paolo Gentiloni, at the UN Summit on Refugees and Migrants," (2016). 
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      Gentiloni used similar messaging in other public statements, often tying the importance of 
helping refugees with the benefit brought to Italy in combating human traffickers. In a tweet, he 
called Humanitarian Corridors a “clear message against human traffickers” and a “good Italian 
example the world should follow.”  And in a December 2017 statement, Gentiloni called the 186
efforts an “historic transition from immigration managed by criminals to controlled, legal and 
safe migration.”  Deputy Secretary of the Council of Europe Gabriella Battaini-Dragoni 187
invoked parallel framing in a 2017 address in Strasbourg, referring to beneficiaries as “the most 
vulnerable” and the program as an “alternative” to the “smuggling of migrants.”  188
     Put together, these statements and more indicate that Italian state officials often employ 
identical framing when discussing the Humanitarian Corridors initiative, focusing on 
vulnerability and mutual safety (refugees as non-threatening, extensive screening, combating 
human trafficking), as well as Italian pride. This suggests that the government viewed these 
lenses as acceptable and maybe even strategic messaging, but it fails nonetheless to fully 
highlight conditions of success, or explain exactly why the government agreed to this 
undertaking in the first place.  
     One tentative hypothesis comes from interpreting these frames in conjunction with the 
time-bound and geopolitical context in which they were constructed. It is unlikely a coincidence, 
for example, that the Humanitarian Corridors initiated in Italy, a country that faced intense 
pressure to respond to the crisis in the wake of high-profile and proximate disasters like the 2013 
and 2015 respective Lampedusa and Libya drownings. Bodies and boats washing up on Italian 
186 "Migrants: Gentiloni, Corridors a Good Italian Example," (2016). 
187Agence France-Presse. "Italy's Migrant Crisis Saw a Huge Turning Point in 2017,” (2017). 
188 Gabriella Battaini-Dragoni. "Humanitarian Corridors: An Alternative to Human Trafficking in the 
Mediterranean," (2017). 
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 shores produced immediate and palpable urgency, exacerbated by a lack of response  by 189
European countries. Since Europe’s reaction was, in the words of Paolo Naso, to “​reduce the 
Lampedusa problem to be an Italian problem,” ​the Humanitarian Corridors initiative appeared 
entirely pragmatic, a measured response to a seemingly immeasurable problem.  As articulated 190
by Gentiloni, this specific scheme would allow Italy to “not be pretending that the problem does 
not exist” while also “managing it humanely and safely...there is a reliable path we can take.”  191
     Inherent in this remark, and supported by the previous analysis, is an almost resigned 
understanding that Italy had do ​something,​ and that the Humanitarian Corridors initiative was 
simply the most palatable option. As such, this particular scheme encapsulates what legal scholar 
Catherine Dauvergne (2015) refers to as the “ongoing tension in the nation's desire to be 
perceived as humanitarian and good yet firmly in control of its sovereign borders.”   192
     The funding, scope, security, and messaging of this scheme allowed for the specific and 
successful alleviation of this tension. The funding framework allowed Italy to provide costly 
assistance with no burden on the budget, thus avoiding popular dissent and unhappy taxpayers 
questioning why their money need pay for foreigners. The program’s breadth similarly eased 
strain by endorsing a 1,000-person cap bound to a two-year timeframe, rather than opening 
borders drastically or facilitating indefinite mobility. And the rigorous screening of beneficiaries 
allowed Italy not only to ease concerns about dangerous newcomers, but also to argue that the 
189 In 2015, UN High Commissioner for Refugees declared that Europe’s response was “not enough,” and 
that “​[W]hen we have a situation like this, the first priority is to save lives. People are dying, you rescue 
them. Europe is a rich continent….It would be natural that a meaningful amount of resources would be 
devoted to this question.” 
190 Benoit Lannoo. "Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Urges Colleagues to Copy Initiative of 'Humanitarian 
Corridors' – The Guest Blog" (2016). 
191 Agence France-Presse. "Italy's Migrant Crisis Saw a Huge Turning Point in 2017," (2017). 
192 Catherine Dauvergne.  H​umanitarianism, Identity, and Nation: Migration Laws of Australia and 
Canada, ​(2015), 58. 
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 initiative actually enhanced safety: in the words of Impagliazzo, security “will be at its max 
compared to those arriving on the boats, because thorough checks will be carried out and digital 
fingerprints taken."  193
     These aspects of the program afforded messaging that paints Italy as a strong state responding 
dynamically to a humanitarian crisis with innovation and generosity, all while strengthening the 
security of Italy and the wider Mediterranean. When viewed in this light, it seems logical that the 
state would agree to such a scheme, especially at no financial cost. The evidence thus implies 
that Italy agreed to the scheme because facilitating Humanitarian Corridors allowed a practical 
and public response, one that simultaneously addressed a pressing problem while also bringing 
publicity to Italy. Pope Francis even lauded the initiative in 2016, expressing his express 
“admiration for the initiative of humanitarian corridors,” a “concrete sign of commitment to 
peace and life.”   194
     This hypothesis gains credence when considered with the fact that Italian officials and FBOs 
have since launched campaigns to encourage other states to follow Italy’s example in opening 
Humanitarian Corridors. While greeting refugees at the airport in 2016, for example, Gentiloni 
publicly expressed his hope that “​that the concept of the ‘humanitarian corridors’ will soon also 
be adopted by other European Member States.”  Since then, relevant stakeholders have held 195
meetings with religious communities and diplomatic leaders in other nations to encourage 
replication. At a 2018 summit with representatives from France, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, 
193 "Sant'Egidio: Humanitarian Corridors Open for One Thousand People" (2015), Vatican Insider World 
News. 
194 Linda Bordoni. "Syrian Refugees Arrive Safely in Rome Thanks to 'Humanitarian Corridor,'" (2018). 
195 ​Benoit Lannoo. "Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Urges Colleagues to Copy Initiative of 'Humanitarian 
Corridors' – The Guest Blog" (2016). 
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 Malta, and Spain, Italian Finance Minister Pier Carlo Padoan stated that “Italy can no longer 
continue to pay for everyone, in financial terms as well as in terms of political effort."  In other 196
words, Italy has communicated on domestic and international stages that the refugee crisis 
concerns all of Europe, and that Italy has done more than its fair share.  
     Italy’s lobbying of nearby countries introduces the possibility that a contributing condition of 
success is the desire to posture as a humanitarian and geopolitical leader. Vicki Squire (2016) 
speaks to this theory, writing that “Italy appears keen to demonstrate political leadership in this 
area,” particularly since the “programme comes at a relatively low price” to the Italian state.  197
Claire Higgins expressed this same sentiment in a 2017 podcast, suggesting that Italy supports 
the initiative because “the ​corridors are a minimal effort by states, but they are presented as 
maximum generosity. The generosity is really coming from non government organizations.”  198
     In theoretical terms, framings of vulnerability and Italian gain are not too different from each 
other; both allow governments to portray themselves positively. In her 2005 book on benevolent 
migration policy in Australia and Canada, Catherine Dauvergne writes of the importance of 
humanitarian action in crafting state identity. Conceptualizing humanitarianism as a mirror that 
reflects back on the country and out to the world, Dauvergne expresses the unique utility of 
empathetic migration policy:  
 
 
 
196 "Migrants Top Agenda at EU's 'Southern Seven' Meeting in Rome” (2018). 
197 Vicki Squire. "Humanitarian Corridors: Beyond Political Gesture," (2016). 
198 ​Claire Higgins. "How Do Italy's Orderly Humanitarian Corridors Work?" (2017). 
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 Humanitarian admission does not serve the nation by "filling gaps in the economy  199
--admitting people because of the value they bring 'us.' Nor does it fit in with an 
ideological vision of community or family--admitting people because they are 'us.' It 
does, however, mark the nation as good, prosperous, and generous. That contribution is 
vital.  200
 
     The generosity Dauvergne mentions is underscored, in the Italian case, by the aforementioned 
focus on vulnerability by politicians, FBOs, and the media. Consider, for instance, that Italian 
newspapers seized upon the fact that one of the first to benefit from the scheme was seven-year 
old Falek Al Hourani, a Syrian girl with cancer in one eye. Above pictures of the child and her 
gauze-covered face, headlines proclaimed: “Syrian cancer kid first to use Italy humanitarian 
corridor,”  “Girl with cancer first to use humanitarian corridor,”  and “Syrian cancer patient, 201 202
7, flown to Italy.”   203
    The story of Falek’s journey was published in European, Australian, Syrian and American 
newspapers, communicating to the world the image of Italy as savior. In a phone interview 
conducted for this thesis, Claire Higgins commented on this dynamic, suggesting that a vital 
aspect of the Humanitarian Corridor’s success is its focus on vulnerability and provision of a 
“counter narrative” to negative conceptions of refugees.  
When each group flies in about every 3 months, that is a photo opportunity. There are  
media there, there’s a press conference, there’s a representative from the government that 
speaks for the government….it’s very much publicized as demonstrating Italian  
hospitality to these groups of people who are very well understood to be in need, so I  
think for me, the entire thing is structured as something to be promoted.  204
 
199 This thesis does not endorse the idea that humanitarian admission fails to benefit national economic 
prospects. Strong bodies of evidence suggest that refugees and immigrants actually stimulate economies.  
200 ​ Dauvergne, 7. 
201 "Syrian Cancer Kid First to Use Italy Humanitarian Corridor,” (2016). 
202 "Girl with Cancer First to Use Humanitarian Corridor,” (2016). 
203 "Syrian Cancer Patient, 7, Flown to Italy," (2016).. 
204 Claire Higgins, phone interview by author. February 19, 2019. 
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      This agreement benefits the state, migrants, and FBOs. Higgins adds that FBOs recognize that 
their motivations differ from those of state actors, but that if public campaigns are “what’s 
required for them to have these visas provided, then that’s a small price to pay for saving 
people’s lives.”   205
       In assessing the conditions that allowed for the successful opening of Humanitarian 
Corridors, it therefore seems necessary to consider geopolitical advantage and vanguard status. 
Italian officials have not publicly admitted to motivation by personal gain (other than the benefits 
of increased domestic and Mediterranean security), but the optics and advantages of international 
leadership, as well as a lack of state burden, imply incentives of self-interest. As articulated by 
Dauvergne (2015): 
Humanitarianism is about identity. The individual identity of the other who benefits from 
our grace is important, but only because of the light it reflects back on us. When we  
admit the deserving, we are good. We bestow grace and hold up that mirror to admire  
ourselves....humanitarianism in migration law is often a self-serving ruse.   206
 
     Most striking in this quotation is not the assertion that humanitarianism is “self-serving,” but 
rather the claim that the identity of the beneficiary reflects certain light upon the benefactor. This 
introduces a final consideration in the analysis of the Italian case: who benefits, who does not, 
and why?  
     This thesis has already established that the program targeted the most vulnerable, a category 
Italy defined in terms of age, trafficking status, health, and disability. But a more potent targeting 
involved geography: over 98 percent of those admitted were of Syrian origin.  Alessia Melillo 207
205 ​Ibid. 
206  Dauvergne, 164. 
207 Michael Collyer, Maria Mancinelli, and Fabio Petito. “Humanitarian Corridors: Safe and Legal 
Pathways to Europe,” (2017). 
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 suggested in her interview with the author of this study that FBOs convinced the Italian 
government to open Humanitarian Corridors because “everybody knows that in Syria there is a 
bleak and long war lasting for years, so everyone has to admit that there is a big problem. So 
they had no problem to say ‘yes the Syrian refugees can come.’”  208
     Melillo disclosed additional information about the “several rounds of meetings and 
discussions” between FBOs and the government that suggest not only a state-readiness to accept 
Syrians,  but a refusal to accept others. Speaking from her office in Rome, Melillo stated that the 
government was open to the proposal “because Syrian people are not the African people.” When 
asked to elaborate, Melillo explained that the ​FCEI approached Italy about opening additional 
Corridors in Africa and was swiftly rejected.  
There are no problems with Syrian refugees, but then if we ask for other people from  
other countries which are suffering from other problems which are not the Syrian  
war, then the matter is different and we received a no …[they] could not say no to admit  
Syrian refugees to come to Europe because everyone knows about this terrible situation  
in Syria, but about migrants from Africa it’s different because they believe that they are  
economic migrants and Europe is saying no to economic migrants.  209
 
     The above statement introduces several complex considerations, including ‘hierarchies of 
deserving’ with regard to aid, disputed refugee status, and potentially even questions of racism. 
For the purposes of this discussion, though, it serves mainly to illustrate that, if taken to be true, 
the Italian government agreed to this scheme only insofar as it benefitted a particularly 
sympathetic class, to the detriment and exclusion of others. Of course it is important to note that 
this is only one account from one relevant actor, speaking about proceedings which are largely 
undisclosed and inaccessible, reserving the need for at least some degree of skepticism.  
208 Alessia Melillo, phone interview by author. February 14, 2019. 
209 Ibid. 
76 
      However, this account cleanly coalesces with the previously discussed narratives of 
vulnerability and dynamics of state-discretion. It also exhibits historical continuity: the Nansen 
scheme, after all, featured similar constraints regarding nationality, restricting travel documents 
at first only for Russians, and then expanding selectively to other groups. This is a consideration 
to which this paper will return in the conclusion.  
     In summary, a preliminary analysis of communications made by FBOs and state actors 
suggest several conditions of success contributing to the Italian Humanitarian Corridors. On the 
part of religious stakeholders, faith-based concern for humanity and a subsequent sense of duty 
sparked action, advocacy, and an allowable arrangement that placed a disproportionate onus on 
Christian communities relative to the state. With regard to governmental stakeholders, the need 
to respond to a physically present problem and the option of a financially burdenless response 
encouraged the government to acquiesce, while framings of (selective) vulnerability incentivized 
Italy through publicity and perception. Given the paucity of public and substantive information 
regarding Italy’s Humanitarian Corridors, it is not presently possible to isolate the relative weight 
of these conditions, though existing research presents the strongest case in favor of political 
expediency and international recognition.  
 
V.IV The Potential for Replicability 
 
     A potentially related factor of success is replicability. Perhaps surprisingly given Melillo’s 
comments, just one year after opening with a focus on Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Italy’s 
Humanitarian Corridor extended to Ethiopia,  resettling 500 vulnerable people of Eritrean, 210
210 This growth of the initial program was funded by funded by FBOs Caritas and the Italian Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference. 
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 Somali, and South-Sudanese descent.  Next the Republic of San Marino signed on, agreeing to 211
resettle a small cohort of refugees within its tiny borders.  And on March 14, 2017, former 212
French Minister of the Interior Bruno Le Roux and former Secretary of State for Cooperation 
Jean-Marie Le Guen signed a protocol with five French FBOs to open a humanitarian corridor 
between France and Lebanon, transforming ​Corridoi Umanitari ​to ​Couloirs Humanitaires​, and 
resettling 500 refugees in the process.  At the time of this writing, Italy, San Marino, France, 213
Belgium, and Andora have all opened Humanitarian Corridors.  214
     The question of replication is particularly noteworthy given that, with this specific program, 
each state retains control over its own implementation, which differs from the intergovernmental 
coordination that characterized Nansen’s initiative. While Humanitarian Corridors contain 
several constants such as the consistent priority of safe and entry, as well as FBO support in the 
form of funds and hospitality, the scheme allows for flexibility of operation depending on the 
mechanisms and peculiarities of each state; countries keep control over scale, funding, 
collaborative partnerships, integration, and legal frameworks.  
     The French system, for example, differs from its Italian counterpart on the legal basis of its 
Corridor. Whereas Italy administers LTV visas on the grounds of Article 25, France does not 
engage with Article 25 at all, choosing instead to operate within domestic frameworks to issue 
211 ​Given Alessia Melillo’s comments about Italian resistance to opening Humanitarian Corridors in 
Africa, the expansion to Ethiopia seems strange. Little public information exists about this arm of the 
initiative, but existing press releases (notably by Caritas and UNHCR) and news coverage highlight the 
fact that the beneficiaries all came from Ethiopian “camps,” perhaps suggesting that by pulling each 
beneficiary directly from a refugee camp, the initiative successfully overcame concerns of voluntary 
economic migration.  
212 ​Collyer, Michael, Maria Mancinelli, and Fabio Petito. “Humanitarian Corridors: Safe and Legal 
Pathways to Europe. 
213 ​"Des Couloirs Humanitaires Pour Les Réfugiés En France à Partir D'aujourd'hui ; L'accord Signé Ce 
Matin à L'Elysée." Sant'Edigio. 
214 "Humanitarian Corridors: Andorra Opens to Refugees." Sant'Edigio. 
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 D-Visas, a form of travel document that presupposes long-term residence. In this way, France 
localizes the process within its own law, tailoring the process to administer a visa that is “strictly 
for asylum and specific to France.”   215
     As evidenced by the aforementioned supranational tension regarding coordination, a 
prevailing preference for individual policy often hinders visa issuance. The French example 
shows that this hurdle can be overcome, and suggests that the Humanitarian Corridors initiative 
spread, at least in part, because it allows national control over border management. Without 
greater access to documents detailing inter-state negotiations, it proves challenging to assess the 
extent to which this consideration actually factored into each participating government’s 
calculus, yet the transferable success of this initiative amidst ongoing disputes of coordination 
presents a compelling case for state-specific flexibility as a condition of success. 
    A lack of expansive hindsight or government transparency makes the Humanitarian Corridors 
initiative difficult to analyze, yet the initial findings of this study prove nonetheless compelling 
as contributions to mobility discourses. The apparent factors of the Humanitarian Corridor 
initiative’s success are actor and context-specific, as evidenced by the division of responsibility, 
varying motivations for action, and public response and perception. The following and final 
chapter considers these factors in conjunction with the Nansen period, advancing tentative 
conclusions and exploring necessary avenues of future research.  
 
 
 
215 Michael Collyer, Maria Mancinelli, and Fabio Petito. “Humanitarian Corridors: Safe and Legal 
Pathways to Europe,” (2017). 
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 Section VI. Conclusions and Implications 
     In discussing Italy’s Humanitarian Corridors initiative, Claire Higgins (2019) called the 
program a “counter narrative” to mainstream discussions of refugee mobility,  addressing its 
unique approach to protection and its focus on the humanity of beneficiaries.  This thesis, in its 216
own way, exists also as a counter narrative; rather than focus on barriers to mobility, as much 
scholarship does, it assesses the potential to overcome those barriers, drawing from relevant 
historical examples of facilitated mobility.  
     Building upon literature of migrant routes to Europe, restricted access to asylum, and the 
asymmetric interpretation of legal frameworks, this thesis poses a critical and consequential 
question: what conditions allow refugees and asylum seekers to safely access European territory 
through mechanisms of facilitated mobility? In an attempt to answer that question, this paper 
employed a comparative case study analysis, as well as exposition of the evolution of legal 
frameworks and institutional landscapes.  
     The first case study analyzed Fridtjof Nansen’s scheme to provide legal status and mobility to 
refugees in the wake of the Russian revolution. This case study proved fruitful to study because 
of its mass scale, level of institutional involvement, and because it unfolded without the 
assistance of existing legal instruments or frameworks. It terms of utility as half of a comparative 
case study analysis, it also afforded the ability to assess the first recorded large-scale example of 
travel documents issued to refugees, allowing potential comparisons to later visa schemes.  
     The analysis of Nansen’s passport program isolated several conditions of success. Most 
clearly, geopolitical dynamics involving war-related fatigue and proximity to Russian ​émigrés 
216 ​Claire Higgins, phone interview by author. February 19, 2019. 
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 encouraged Europe to facilitate mobility, given the importance of preserving a healing continent 
and the destabilization that would result from an influx of people lacking means of movement. 
Additionally, perception of common and existential threat promoted action, since the issuance of 
travel documents to former-Russian citizens served as a bold act of defiance against communism.  
     As such, the conditions allowing for success during the Nansen era were intensely situational 
in terms of political and geographic landscapes. A pressing problem threatened Europe, and 
Nansen’s proposal created a logistically pleasing solution, one that simultaneously worked to 
stabilize the region and reject communism. National interest and international obligation aligned, 
unlike in Canada where the two clashed. 
     The determinants of success were therefore defined by legal and structural factors, detached 
from considerations of humanitarian duty or moral sway. It is worth noting, also, that the Nansen 
period lacked established frameworks, and built its own institutional capacity. The following 
decades experienced an explosion of institutionalization and framework formation, though the 
results were ambiguous, leaving room for interpretation and state-specific discretion. 
     The second case study analyzed Italy’s Humanitarian Corridors initiative, a worthwhile 
program to study given its potential for replication and its adroit facilitation of mobility in the 
face of supranational tension and state-specific discretion. Its proximity to migrant flows and the 
usage of travel documents (humanitarian visas) similarly benefitted this study by retaining 
continuity with the Nansen era, enabling the comparative approach.  
     Though hindered by a lack of available data, analysis of the Humanitarian Corridors scheme 
isolated a host of potential determinants of success, all of which prove promising as leads for 
further investigation. A primary factor was the religious sense of obligation exhibited by  
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 FBOs;  without such motivation, the constituent organizations would unlikely have approached 217
the state, and they almost certainly would not have agreed to such an unequal arrangement of 
responsibility.  This points to the second factor: lack of financial burden on the Italian state. 218
The scheme presented an incredibly low-cost response to a high-cost problem, palatable in terms 
of funding, scope, and lack of institutional legwork.  
    The existing data therefore suggest that this scheme succeeded in facilitating mobility because 
the government was faced with a pressing problem and presented with a convenient solution. 
The initiative was convenient not only logistically but also politically and optically. Careful 
framing isolated the benefit to Italy and highlighted the state’s generosity in receiving the most 
vulnerable, allowing the Corridors to paint Italy as a defender of the defenceless, a model of 
action rising from a sea of inaction. The conditions for success with this initiative therefore stem 
from multiple considerations and actors, but ultimately center on state convenience and the 
ability to spin a low-cost, low-volume program into an international example of political 
leadership and generosity. As with the Nansen period, national interest and global responsibility 
fused. 
     On one hand, the two respective cases are not fully comparable given that they represent an 
evolution: each operated in wildly different times with actors making use of wildly different 
217 It is worth noting that not all religious communities and organizations act on religious duty. After the 
Pope called on Catholic churches to host refugees, a faction of the Polish clergy responded, according to 
Mazepus and Berardi (2016), that: “the Pope’s words about refugees were not dogma.” Other clergyman 
rallied behind the Pope’s call, voicing support and opening negotiations with the government. This 
suggests that not all people or communities of faith prioritize religious obligation equally.  
218 The role of religious organizations and obligation clearly aided the Humanitarian Corridors initiative 
and served as a primary catalyst. The impetus of Nansen’s scheme lacked this religious consideration, 
implying that while several ties exist between the two initiatives, other aspects remain time-bound and 
context-specific.  
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 tools. On the other hand, both present striking examples of movement in the face of restriction, 
and as such, overlaps between their determinants introduce the potential for wider conclusions. 
     Four main parallels exist between the two eras, linking specific conditions of success to a 
deeper and tentatively generalizable discussion of mobility. First, both Nansen and the Italy’s 
Humanitarian Corridors restricted access to their schemes. In the 1920s, refugee travel 
documents were initially reserved for people of Russian descent, and only later selectively 
extended on a country-of-origin basis. Italy’s Humanitarian Corridor was similarly prohibitive, 
issuing visas almost exclusively to Syrians before extending cautiously to others. This suggests 
that perhaps movement is more easily facilitated when nationally limited, tied tightly to specific 
subgroups. It additionally suggests that schemes may operate iteratively, expanding only after 
seeing and assessing the results of the initial program (for instance, Italy saw positive responses 
with its Syrian intake, and therefore spread. The same argument applies to Nansen).  
     The second parallel involves the reactionary nature of each scheme; both initiatives grew in 
response to a palatable problem (an influx of stateless people for Nansen, increased drownings 
and trafficking for Italy). In this way, proximity seems a vital consideration, as does the 
perception that some sort of action is required. This implies that mobility is facilitated for 
refugees not on normative or standard grounds, but rather as a steam valve to relieve pressure 
from pressing problems (whether the program actually alleviates the crisis, as with Nansen, or 
merely gives the illusion of substantive aid, as with Italy’s Corridor, is an entirely a different 
matter). 
     A third similarity involves the ability of states and relevant actors to facilitate mobility 
without definitive legal mandate. The Nansen scheme existed prior to the creation of legal 
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 frameworks regarding refugee rights and affordances, operating through institutional directives. 
The Humanitarian Corridors initiative, while operating within EU and Schengen legal 
frameworks, also lacked formal instruction by law, given the ambiguous code and a preference 
for state-discretion. This indicates that attempts at mobility can succeed without the full support 
of legal systems, given that relevant actors fully invest and provide innovative approaches.  219
     The fourth and final analog is the potentially-incendiary statement that neither case of 
facilitated mobility stemmed from humanitarian concern. This argument is easy to make for the 
Nansen scheme given the League of Nation’s focus on legal status and global order, as well as 
Europe’s collective interest in curbing communism. The argument is harder to make (and more 
controversial) with the Italian case, given that the stated intent of its Humanitarian Corridors is to 
reduce human trafficking and protect the most vulnerable. However, evidence suggests that the 
motivation was more self-serving than the framing leads one to believe. Consider, for instance, 
that Italy’s program was only extended to approximately 1,500 people, but was billed as a model 
of generosity and goodness around the world. As the Nansen passports benefitted Europe by 
providing stability and rejecting communism, the Humanitarian Corridors benefitted Italy in 
terms of identity and leadership, suggesting that mobility is facilitated, at least in part, when it 
serves self-interest.  
     Taken together, this analysis provides compelling considerations and introduces potential 
implications for policy. First and foremost, this study serves as a reminder that states and 
219 ​A refugee advocate may take issue with this argument, positing that a legal mandate does indeed exist 
(in the form of the 1951 Convention) and that states ignore that mandate by only executing limited 
schemes of mobility. This thesis holds that although legal frameworks exist, they fall short of a mandate 
because of ambiguous wording. The 1951 Convention, for examples, calls on states to give “sympathetic 
consideration” to refugees who cannot obtain travel documents, but fails to define that phrase or explain 
its practical implications. 
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 relevant actors can in fact facilitate refugee mobility, and that narratives of crisis and 
securitization, while valid, serve to distract from this vital and life-saving capacity. When 
assessing potential responses to forced migration, the issuance of travel documents should and 
must be a consideration. In applying the wider lessons of Nansen and the Humanitarian 
Corridors, policy-makers need remember the paramount importance of burden-sharing, as well 
as the importance of mutual benefit. Dropping the guise of selfless aid, policy-makers must craft 
context-specific and dynamic schemes that benefit the benefactor as well as the beneficiary, 
ideally also building consensus between states and actors to reduce strain on any one sponsor. 
Following the examples of the two discussed cases, policy-makers should explore normative 
approaches of soft-law, understanding also that a clearer codification of law would likely allow 
for higher levels of safe and legal mobility.  
     This thesis has labored to proceed with transparency regarding its limitations. The first 
regards the lack of existing scholarship on refugee mobility. While academics have written 
extensively on migration, and increasingly on barriers to mobility, few have taken a critical and 
historical look at times when institutions and states have overcome those barriers. This presents 
an important gap in the literature that begs filling, while simultaneously restricting the body of 
scholarship from which to work. A related limitation stems from insufficient access to data, a 
complication that slightly impacted analysis of the Nansen era and heavily impacted analysis of 
the Humanitarian Corridors initiative, particularly given that FBO-state negotiations took place 
behind closed doors. A third limitation stems from the time at which this thesis was written; 
given the temporal proximity of the Humanitarian Corridors initiative, there exists a lack of 
post-project evaluations and historical hindsight through which to assess. The Italian initiative 
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 has not received in-depth scholarly scrutiny, which positions this thesis at the forefront of its 
field while burdening it with sparse data.  
     This study has sought to mediate these limitations by employing close and contextual 
analyses of existing literature, public statements, interviews, and geopolitical trends. Even still, 
these limitations present important implications for future research: subsequent scholarship 
would benefit immensely from greater access to data regarding the negotiations behind Italy’s 
Humanitarian Corridors, as well as a comparative analysis of the replicated schemes in other 
countries. Further research should also consider the functioning of Humanitarian Corridors 
amidst changing governments, particularly in Italy where 2018 elections ushered in a 
government far less tolerant of refugees than the one under which the initiative started.  Lastly, 220
in October 2018, the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
Committee called for the establishment of a harmonized humanitarian visa scheme in Europe, 
and subsequent research should fully analyze this move, assessing its motivation, traction, and 
impact within European discourse and policy.  
     The issuance of refugee travel documents is hardly a panacea to the ugly, withering effects of 
forced migration. Mobility schemes are small in scope, politically tenuous, and historically rare; 
as such, they must be conceptualized as complementary to, rather than replacing, existing 
approaches. But more important than the volume of beneficiaries is the amount of potential 
impact. Nansen Passports and Humanitarian Corridors show that managed migration, secure 
220 In her interview, Alessia Melillo said of the new Italian government: “We have this agreement for 
another year so the whole 2019 we have this project running, and then we will try to renegotiate...I have 
no idea at the moment how it will go. We have permission to work for 2019 but then I really have no idea. 
I’m sure that it will get more difficult every day. I don’t know how it will go in 2020.” 
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 borders, and humane policy can all coexist. To scholars and policy makers, as well as politicians 
struggling to respond, this knowledge brings promise. To refugees seeking protection, it brings 
salvation. An ocean can once more be just an ocean, a grave just a grave. The two need not mix.  
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